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INTRODUCTION

On March 5, 1984, the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Lynch
2
v.Donnelly.1 Although Lynch did not open to unanimous acclaim, there
was little doubt what Lynch stood for. At the time, the decision was
regarded as holding that governments may celebrate the Christmas season by sponsoring the unambiguously Christian symbol of a crAche
without running afoul of the establishment clause of the first amendment.'
The Supreme Court has signalled no retreat from Lynch; yet surprisingly for those who take seriously traditional concepts of stare decisis,
the municipality has prevailed in only one of the four establishment clause
challenges to municipally sponsored creches to reach the courts of appeals
since Lynch. The other three circuits distinguished Lynch on exceedingly4
doubtful grounds and proceeded to apply the Lemon v. Kurtzman test,
the same three-part analysis that in Lynch had yielded the opposite result.
Thus, in only one post-Lynch case has a court of appeals appeared faithful to the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch. Recently, the Supreme Court
5
announced its intention to review one of the three contrary cases.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lynch is difficult to reconcile with
a coherent theory of establishment clause principles. The Court's analysis is troublesome doctrinally and the case's result is disturbing to those
who value individual religious freedom and the integrity of civil government. 6 On one level, Lynch raises questions about the Court's commitment to liberty when this country's dominant religious traditions and
constitutional aspirations appear to conflict. The reaction to Lynch in the
lower courts in turn presents difficult questions concerning the responsibilities of inferior federal courts to the sometimes competing dictates of
the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and their own consciences.
This article will explore these issues as a case study in judicial method,
with special emphasis on judicial interpretation of what has been called
1. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
2. E.g., Redlich, Nativity Ruling Insults Jews, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1984, at A19,
col. 2, quoted in L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT, 124-26 (1984). See
also infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
3. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall

- A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770; Fairchild, Lynch v. Donnelly:
The Case for the Creche, 29 ST.Louis U.L.J. 459 (1985). For contemporaneous media accounts
of Lynch, see Greenhouse, High Court Rules Cities May Put Up Nativity Displays, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 6, 1984, at Al, col. 6; Barbash, City-Funded Cr&he is Permitted,Wash. Post,
Mar. 6,1984, at A1, col. 1; High Court Ruling on Church, State, San Francisco Chron., Mar.
6, 1984, at 1, col. 1. Greenhouse noted the assertion of the Lynch dissenters that a crdche
standing alone, unlike the crlche involved in Lynch, might call for a different result. Greenhouse, Court Rules City's Display of Creche O.K., Denver Post, Mar. 6, 1984, at Al, col.
1. This distinction is one of two relied upon by the lower courts in the three cases discussed
below.
4. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5. ACLU v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S.
Ct. 53 (1988).
6. "IT]he establishment of a religion was equally feared because of its tendencies to
political tyranny and subversion of civil authority." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
430 (1961).
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"intercourt stare decisis ' when federal appellate courts are confronted
with Supreme Court constitutional precedent they believe was wrongly
decided. I shall examine the options available to a court in such circumstances, the choices apparently made by the courts in the examples I have
chosen, and what the possibilities suggest about those courts' conception
of law.
I conclude that, at least in constitutional cases (and probably in other
areas as well), when the Supreme Court clearly has announced a decision
that embodies a choice from among competing doctrinal, political, moral,
and judicial considerations, lower courts are bound to interpret that decision in a way that is faithful to the substance of the principles embodied
in the choices made. In reaching this conclusion, I also hope to show that
its correctness is not as self-evident as a casual conception of stare decisis otherwise might suggest. There are two bases for my conclusion. First,
explicit defiance of such principles, while sometimes yielding desirable
results and reflecting the virtue of candor, compromises too many values
important to what many members of the legal community regard as a
healthy political and moral system of law to be considered a legitimate
alternative - at least in most cases. Second, the other option available
to those lower courts that seek to avoid the force of such precedent semantic but not substantive faithfulness to precedent - inflicts all the
damage of outright defiance, compounded by the corrosive effect of pretextual or fictive reasoning.
This article is organized into four sections. The first summarizes the
facts and reasoning of the Supreme Court in Lynch. The second does the
same for each of the four circuit court cases. Section three critiques Lynch,
to establish a foundation for understanding and critiquing the lower
courts' subsequent interpretations of Lynch. Finally, section four provides
both a descriptive analysis and a critique of the lower courts' interpretation of Lynch, focusing on the issues of stare decisis and judicial method
raised by those interpretations.
I.

LYNCH V. DONNELLY

The facts in Lynch as recited by the Supreme Court are simple.' For
forty years, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, at its own expense,
erected annually "a Christmas display as part of its observance of the
Christmas holiday season." The display was situated in a privately owned
park located in the shopping district. Part of the display was a creche,
7. The term stare decisis is used to describe both the extent to which a court is bound
by its own precedent - "intracourt stare decisis" - and the effect of precedents of higher
courts on lower courts - "intercourt state decisis." See Hardisty, Reflections on StareDecisis,
55 IND. L.J. 41, 46 & n.24 (1979).
8. One fact noted by the district court but not recited in the Court's opinion is the
proximity (within 300 feet) to Pawtucket's city hall of the park in which the creche was located.
Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (D.R.I. 1981).
9. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
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"including the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings,
and animals, all ranging in height from 5" to 5'."' 11 The display also
included
many of the figures and decorations traditionally associated with
Christmas, including, among other things, a Santa Claus house,
reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas
tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a
clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights,
[and] a large banner that reads 'Seasons Greetings' ....
The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs (Pawtucket residents and
individual members of the Rhode Island American Civil Liberties Union)
that inclusion of the creche in the display failed all three prongs of the
tripartite Lemon test, thus violating the establishment clause.' 2 A divided
panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis that defendants had failed to establish a secular purpose and had in fact endorsed
religious beliefs. 3
The Supreme Court commenced its analysis by noting "the inescapable tension between the objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of
either the church or the state upon the other, and the reality that, as the
court has so often noted, total separation of the two is not possible.""
The Court foreshadowed its result by emphasizing that the familiar wallof-separation metaphor is "not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and
state."" Complete separation of church and state is not required; state
hostility to religion is at odds with the free exercise clause; and "callous
indifference" is not mandated by the establishment clause. 6
The Court proceeded to recite numerous examples, some dating back
to the Bill of Rights' own nativity in 1789, of governmental involvement
in religious matters. For example, the First Congress enacted legislation
providing for paid chaplains for the House of Representatives and Senate. 7
10. Id
11. Id.
12. Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1178.
13. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1035 (1st Cir. 1982).
14. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672.
15. Id at 673. For reference to the "wall" metaphor, usually attributed to Thomas Jefferson's reply to an address by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, see Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1879) (quoting Jefferson's reply). Then-Justice Rehnquist has argued the Court's occasional
reference to Jefferson's metaphor takes it out of its historical context: It appeared in a short
note of courtesy by Jefferson (who was in France when the Bill of Rights was passed by
Congress and ratified by the states) 14 years after passage by Congress of the Bill of Rights.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973)).
17. Id at 674. Based in part on such historical evidence, the Court has held that a state
legislature's employment of official legislative chaplains to open each day of its sessions with
a prayer does not violate the establishment clause. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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The Court noted other examples of "official acknowledgment by all three
branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at
least 1789."18
The Court stated that establishment clause analysis consists of a caseby-case application of a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."' 9 In drawing
that line, the Court noted, it often has been "useful" to apply the tripartite test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which asks (1)whether the challenged
activity has a secular purpose, (2)whether its primary effect is to advance
or inhibit religion, and (3)whether it creates an excessive entanglement
of government with religion.20 The Court pointed out, however, that "we
have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area. "2'

Nevertheless, the Court applied Lemon with the caveat that "the focus
of our inquiry must be on the creche in the context of the Christmas season.' '22 The Court concluded that the District Court had "plainly erred
18. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674. Those examples include presidential proclamations of a
day of Thanksgiving and Christmas as national holidays, id at 675 nn.2-3; acts of Congress
providing paid leave for federal employees on such national holidays, id; the motto "In God
at 676; inclusion of the language "one nation under
We Trust" on our national currency, id.
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, id; an act of Congress directing the President to proclaim,
and presidential proclamation of, a National Day of Prayer, id at 677; presidential proclamation of Jewish Heritage Week and Jewish High Holy Days, id.; and government-funded
public display in museums and other public buildings (including the Supreme Court) of artwork depicting religious themes predominantly inspired by one faith, id
19. Id at 678-79 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614). The examples listed in Lemon concerned the issue of excessive entanglement, and were quite removed from the active promotion of Christian symbology in Lynch: "Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations,
and state requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws are examples of necessary
and permissible contacts." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
20. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 615).
21. Lynch. 465 U.S. at 679 (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 at 677-78 (1971);
Nyquist 413 U.S. at 773). The Court's citation to Nyquist and Tilton is puzzling, for in both
cases the Court analyzed the government aid to church-related educational institutions under
the elements of the Lemon test.
The Court in Lynch observed that it had declined to apply the Lemon analysis in Marsh,
463 U.S. 783, and in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). Actually, in Larson the Court
said that the Lemon v. Kurtzman test was "intended to apply to laws affording a uniform
benefit to all religions, and not to provisions... that discriminate among religions." 456
U.S. at 252. While stating that application of Lemon was not necessary to the outcome, the
Court concluded that the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon would invalidate the law
challenged in Larson. Id. at 252-53. Marsh andLarson led to speculation that the Court was
abandoning the Lemon test. Note, Of Crosses and Creches: The EstablishmentClause And
Publicly SponsoredDisplays of Religious Symbols, 35 AMER. U.L. REV. 477, 479 (1986). And,

as discussed below, although the Court in Lynch invoked Lemon, its free-wheeling application of the Lemon test did little to indicate a reaffirmation of Lemon's vitality. Since Lynch,
however, the Court has employed Lemon's analysis more vigorously. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree,

472 U.S. 38, 55 (1985). See Simson, The Establishment Clause In the Supreme Court: Rethink-

ing the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 907 (1987) (1984-85 term showed revitalization of Lemon test).
22. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679. To illustrate, the Court referred to Stone v. Graham,in
which a copy of the Decalogue had been posted in a public school "purely as a religious admonition, not 'integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be
used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like'."
Id (quoting Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam)). See also School
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by focusing almost exclusively on the crdche," in that "[flocus exclusively
on the religious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its
invalidation under the Establishment Clause." 2 3 The "narrow question"
raised by the case under the first prong of Lemon was whether there was
"a secular purpose" for the display of the crdche.1' The purpose need not
be exclusively secular.2 5 Rejecting the District Court's findings as clearly
erroneous, the Supreme Court concluded that among the legitimate secular purposes for the creche were celebration
of the Christmas holiday and
26
depiction of the origins of that holiday.
The Court also rejected the District Court's conclusion that the
primary effect of the crdche was to advance religion. Rather, the creche
"merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some
religions. 2 7 In that regard, the Court found Pawtucket's inclusion of a
creche in its display as akin to expenditure of public funds for textbooks
supplied to children attending church-sponsored schools2 8 and for transportation of students to church-sponsored schools, 29 noncategorical grants
to church-sponsored colleges, 30 tax exemption for church-owned properties 3 Sunday closing,3 2 school release-time program for religious training, 3 and legislative prayers.14 The benefit to Christianity of a government-sponsored crdche, the Court concluded, was "indirect, remote, and
incidental . .. ."5
The Supreme Court also found the crdche did not give rise to excessive entanglement with religion. Although the litigation had engendered
some political divisiveness, the Court rejected the District Court's conclusion that political divisiveness caused by the litigation rose to the level
of excessive entanglement.
The remainder of the majority opinion was devoted to rebuttal of a
point sharply raised in Justice Brennan's dissent. Brennan pointed out
the unmistakably denominational character of the crdche: "a mystical
recreation of an event that lies at the heart of the Christian Faith."3 The
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (invalidation of daily Bible reading
in public schools does not preclude study of the Bible "objectively as part of secular program of education ....
").
23. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id at 681 (emphasis added).
Id at 680-81.
Id at 681.
Id at 682 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).

29. Tilton, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
30. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
31. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
32. McGowan, 366 U.S. 420.
33. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
34. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783. On the other side of that line lay Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (vesting government licensing power in churches); McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction in public school classrooms,
because it provided sectarian groups with pupils for religious education through use of compulsory education laws).
35. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
36. Id at 711 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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majority characterized Brennan's concern as "a stilted overreaction contrary to our history and our holdings." 7 The dissent's view, the majority
reasoned, would require invalidation under the establishment clause of
"a host of other forms of taking official note of Christmas, and of our religious heritage. "38
Justice O'Connor's concurrence sought to clarify the appropriate
analytical model suggested in Lemon v. Kurtzman. She would examine
two questions: (1) whether the challenged activity gives rise to excessive
entanglement with religious institutions, and (2) whether the activity constitutes government approval or disapproval of religion. The problem with
activity that endorses religions is that it communicates "to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to the adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community." 39
For Justice O'Connor, the central question in Lynch was whether the
Pawtucket creche constituted government approval of Christianity. That
question depends both on what Pawtucket intended to communicate ("subjective" content) and what message actually was conveyed ("objective"
content). O'Connor concluded that the "evident purpose of including the
creche in the larger display was not promotion of the religious content
of the creche but celebration of the public holiday through its traditional
symbols" - a legitimate secular purpose. 4 As to the "objective" message, O'Connor believed that the "overall holiday setting" changes what
viewers may otherwise fairly understand to be the purpose of the display
- just as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious
content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of
that content.4 The creche, therefore, constituted government
"acknowl42
edgment," as opposed to "endorsement," of religion.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented, arguing that application of the standards under Lemon v. Kurtzman requires
invalidation of Pawtucket's sponsorship of the creche. The dissenters
inferred a sectarian purpose from the premise that Pawtucket's alleged
secular interest - promotion of Christmas spirit, goodwill, and retail sales
- could have been served without including the creche. Inclusion of the
creche manifested "the wholly religious purpose of 'keep[ing] Christ in
Christmas'." 3 The minority asked the same question as did Justice O'Connor concerning the primary effect of the activity, but concluded that
minority religious groups and atheists clearly would understand the creche
"to convey the message that their views are not similarly worthy of pub37. Id, at 686 (majority opinion).
38. l
39. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. Id at 691.
41. Id. at 692.
42. Id at 692-93.
43. Id. at 700-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting district court opinion, Donnelly, 525
F. Supp. at 1173).
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lic recognition nor entitled to public support. It was precisely this sort
of religious chauvinism
that the Establishment Clause was intended
44
forever to prohibit."
The minority accused the majority of blinking reality by claiming that
inclusion of such a distinctly religious object, and one so strongly identified with a particular faith, amounts to nothing more than use of a traditional holiday symbol and bestowal of only an incidental, indirect, and
remote benefit of religion.'" The minority further rejected the majority's
syllogism that once the Court finds designation of Christmas as a public
holiday constitutional, it follows that all government association with the
holiday is permissible. Christmas, and government accommodations of
a national holiday in recognition thereof, have secular impacts that lie
within the confines of the establishment clause. The crdche, by contrast,
goes beyond recognition of an historic event to representation of one of
the central elements of Christian
dogma - "that God sent His Son into
4 6
the world to be a Messiah.
The minority criticized the majority's analysis of and reliance on history. First, the minority observed that the court "until today, consistently
47
limited its historical inquiry to the particular practice under review."
Second, the dissenters' research revealed that at the time the Bill of Rights
was adopted, there was no settled pattern of celebrating Christmas either
publicly or privately. Moreover, the historical evidence suggests that
"development of
Christmas as a public holiday is a comparatively recent
8
phenomenon."4
II. LYNCH IN THE LOWER COURTS

The constitutionality of a municipally sponsored creche has been
challenged in the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits since Lynch
was decided. Only the Second Circuit has found the crdche to be permissible under the Establishment Clause as interpreted in Lynch. The other
three circuits, using the same test applied by the Supreme Court in Lynch,
have found some basis for avoiding having Lynch determine the result.
This section will review briefly the facts and analyses in each of those
cases. In each of the three negative outcomes, one member of the appellate panel has dissented, arguing that Lynch and respect for stare decisis
compel validation of the creches. Although the distinctions retailed by
the three circuits may enjoy a superficial plausibility, I will attempt to
show in section four of this article that a principled reading of Lynch will
not bear the interpretation placed on it by those courts.
44. Id. at 701 (footnote omitted). The dissenters also suggested that the risk of excessive entanglement with religion was significant. Id. at 702.
45. Id at 705-06.
46. Id at 711.
47. Id at 719. See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445 (history of Sunday Closing laws);
Wak, 397 U.S. at 676-80 (history of property tax exemptions for religious organization); Marsh,
463 U.S. at 787-91 (history of legislative chaplains).
48. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 720.
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A. American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago
American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago49 was a challenge to
inclusion of a nativity scene in the display and decorations for the 1985
Christmas season. The nativity display, located inside Chicago's City Hall,
consisted of white plaster figures of Jesus, Mary, Joseph, the three wise
men, shepherds, and animals, all under twelve inches in height; it was
backed by a banner reading: "On Earth Peace - Good Will Toward Men."
Only minimal public funds were contributed for electricity to illuminate
the privately owned scene. The display also contained six rectangular disclaimer signs, seven and one-half inches by ten inches, which announced:
"Donated by the Chicago Plasterer's Institute - this exhibit is neither50
sponsored nor endorsed by the Government of the City of Chicago.
Within ten to ninety feet of the creche, the City of Chicago erected a number of other seasonal decorations in City Hall, including wreaths, a
Christmas Tree, and a mechanical Santa Claus accompanied by the reindeer and a sleigh."
The majority in American Jewish Congress rejected the District
Court's conclusion that Lynch mandated approval of the creche, asserting two primary bases for distinction. First, the majority described the
Chicago creche as "self-contained, rather than some element of a larger
display."52 The other decorations, in the Court's view, were too far away
from or did not bear a sufficiently close "thematic" relationship to the
creche to render the crdche simply one element of a larger Christmas display. The disclaimer signs, instead of accomplishing their ostensible purpose, served only to distinguish the creche further from its surroundings.
"In this case, therefore, unlike Lynch, the secularized decorations in the
53
vicinity of the nativity scene were not clearly part of the same display.
Second, the crdche's placement in City Hall - much more closely associated with government than a privately owned park in a shopping disto citizen
trict and therefore a more powerful message from government
54
- "plainly" distinguished the Chicago crdche from Lynch.
Having disposed of Lynch, the Seventh Circuit proceeded with a much
more exacting application of Lemon than that undertaken by the Supreme
Court in Lynch. The rub for the Seventh Circuit was the creche's effect
of advancing religion.5 5 Like the dissenters in Lynch, the Seventh Circuit
regarded the creche as "an unequivocal Christian symbol." 56 Its presence
49. 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987).
50. Id. at 122-23.
51. Id. at 122. Other seasonal decorations adorned City Hall at a greater distance from
the creche, including large and small Christmas trees, Christmas lights, a contribution box,
and an artificial snowman. Seasonal performances, including caroling by the local school children, were held in this complex; and recorded holiday music played continuously in the plaza.
52. Id. at 125.
53. Id at 126.
54. Id
55. Id at 127. The Seventh Circuit found legitimate the city's stated secular purposes
- recognition of a tradition of official acknowledgment of Christmas, recognition of public
sentiment in favor of the creche, and the attraction of visitors to the downtown district.
56. Id. (quoting American Civil Liberties Union v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265,
271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961 (1986)).
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in City Hall, where the presence of government is unavoidable in both
a real and a symbolic sense, "inevitably creates a clear and strong impression that the local government tacitly endorses Christianity.""
Judge Easterbrook, in dissent, saw the similarities between the display in Lynch and Chicago as far more substantial than the differences.
For him, the creche's location among the City's entire Christmas display
was dispositive; the location of the entire Christmas display in a park or
City Hall did not matter. In both Lynch and American Jewish Congress,
the government sponsorship of the creche was patent.58
B. ACLU v. County of Allegheny
The Third Circuit found American Jewish Congress to be more instructive than Lynch in considering the constitutionality of a creche in ACLU
v. County of Allegheny.5 9 The Allegheny County crdche was located on
the first floor of the county courthouse, and consisted of the infant Jesus,
the Virgin Mary, Joseph, the Three Wise Men, shepherds, animals, and
an angel holding a banner that read "Gloria in Excelsis Deo." The creche
was owned by a Catholic organization which erected, arranged, and disassembled the display every year; and a sign in front of the display stated:
"This display donated by the Holy Name Society.""0 The county provided
a "dolly and minimal aid" to transport the crdche to and from storage
in the courthouse basement. The crdche was decorated at public expense,
with poinsettia plants and evergreen trees. The courthouse building was
also decorated throughout with wreaths, trees, and Santa Clauses; and
the grand staircase behind the crdche was the scene of Christmas carol
programs sponsored by the County.'1
The Third Circuit disagreed with the District Court's conclusion that
Lynch required denial of an injunction. After reciting the facts in Lynch
and describing the post-Lynch case law, the court focused on the second
element of the Lemon test - whether the challenged activity has the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. To the majority, application of its embellishment of the Lemon test to the case at hand led "inexorably" to the conclusion that the Allegheny County creche violated the
57. American Jewish Congress, 827 F.2d at 128. (The disclaimer signs, the court noted,
failed to dispel the message of government endorsement of Christianity.)
58. Id at 131-32. Judge Easterbrook also volunteered criticism of the Supreme Court's
recourse to "multifactor balances": "When everything matters, when nothing is dispositive,
when we must juggle incommensurable factors, a judge can do little but announce his gestalt."
Id at 128-29 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). While Judge Easterbrook's complaint is well taken
as a general matter, it is misplaced in the context of Lemon. Lemon does require a court
to consider several factual variables in deciding the case; but it does not, precisely speaking, call for the assessment of the relative "weights" of the values at stake. See Aleinikoff,
ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943, 945 & n.8 (1987) (Lemon
not within Aleinikoff's definition of balancing test).
59. 842 F.2d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 53 (1988).
60. Id. at 657.
61. Id. The City of Pittsburgh erected annually in front of the City and County building, one block from the courthouse, an 18-foot-tall menorah owned by a private Jewish organization. The menorah was set up next to a 45-foot-tall Christmas tree, also erected by the City.
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establishment clause. The display was conspicuously situated in a public
building "devoted to core functions of government," could not "reasonably be deemed to have been subsumed by a larger display of nonreligious
and
items," "would be viewed as pertaining to a particular religion,"
6
involved public participation (albeit minimal) in its handling.
Judge Weis dissented. Lynch, he believed, "directly addresses and conclusively resolves the dispute we encounter here." He characterized the
post-Lynch appellate cases as reflecting "less an attempt to apply the
Supreme Court's holding in Lynch than a disapproving rejection of its
message."64 Like Judge Easterbrook, Judge Weis read Lynch as clearly
upholding government observance of the Christmas holiday by recognizing its origin. He "found no indication [in Lynch] that the Pawtucket display survived constitutional scrutiny because it was situated in a private
park rather than a county courthouse, or because it closely resembled a
miniature golf course with candystriped poles, talking wishing wells, and
cutout elephants." ' 6I
C. ACLU v. City of Birmingham
The third post-Lynch case, ACLU v. City of Birmingham,6 6 involved
a cr6che erected annually in front of the Birmingham, Michigan City Hall.
The display consisted of the figures of the Christ Child, the Mother Mary,
Joseph, three costumed shepherds, and several lambs. The display was
publicly owned, erected, and maintained. No other objects were included
in the display.
Following Lynch on the purpose and entanglement elements of Lemon,
the Sixth Circuit found a secular purpose in celebration of Christmas as
a national holiday by displaying a creche and found no excessive entanglement with religion. 7 Under the effects element, however, the Birmingham creche yielded a different result:
The Third Circuit regarded the menorah as subject to the same analysis as the creche,
and stated that the case's outcome would have been the same whether both or either symbol were in issue. I& at 662, n.1. Notwithstanding testimony that a menorah, unlike a torah
scroll, has "no inherent religious significance," the majority concluded that the general public
would miss that "religious fine point" and would perceive the menorah's placement as an
endorsement of religion. Id. at 662. See also Lubavitch of Iowa, Inc. v. Walters, 808 F.2d
656, 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction sought to compel state
officials to allow placement of menorah on public grounds next to a Christmas tree).
62. Allegheny, 842 F.2d at 662. Out of Lemon, in the light of Lynch, the court squeezed
six variables to consider in making that determination: "(1 the location of the display; (2)
whether the display is part of a larger configuration including nonreligious items; (3) the
religious intensity of the display; (4) whether the display is shown in connection with a general
secular holiday; (5) the degree of public participation in the ownership and maintenance of
the display; and (6) the existence of disclaimers of public sponsorship of the display." Id
The court reached the same conclusion with respect to the menorah, with the added observation that: "the menorah, unlike the creche, is not associated with a holiday with secular
aspects." Id
63. Id at 666 (Weis, J., dissenting).
64. Id at 668. Evenhandedness requires notation that Judge Weis' dissenting opinion
manifested his obvious approving acceptance of Lynch's message.
65. ld at 669.
66. 791 F.2d 1561, 1562 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denie4 479 U.S. 939 (1986).
67. Id at 1565-66.
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When surrounded by a multitude of secular symbols of Christmas,
a nativity scene may do no more than remind an observer that
the holiday has a religious origin. But when the nonreligious trappings are stripped away, there remains only the universally recognized symbol for the central affirmation of a single religion Christianity."
The majority read the Supreme Court's directive to view the cr6che "in
the context of the Christmas Holiday season" as referring to the Pawtucket creche's inclusion among secular symbols of the season, and distinguished the Birmingham cr~che on the basis that it stood alone.
Judge Nelson dissented. He found nothing in Lynch that required the
inclusion of secular Christmas symbols in a display to bring a governmentsponsored nativity scene into compliance with the establishment clause.
He doubted that "it is appropriate for the federal courts to tell the towns
and the villages of America how much paganism they need to put in their
Christmas decoration, and I am reluctant to attribute to the Supreme
Court an intent to point us in that direction by implication." 69
D. McCreary v. Stone
Each of the preceding cases expressly repudiated the Second Circuit's
ruling in McCreary v. Stone.7 The Scarsdale creche in McCreary, like the
one in Birmingham, stood alone rather than as part of a larger holiday
display and was erected on city-owned land by a private organization at
no expense to the city." A small sign in front of the Scarsdale display
disclaimed: "This creche has been erected and maintained solely by the
Scarsdale Creche Committee, a private organization."7" Objections to the
creche prompted the city to deny the Scarsdale Creche Committee's
request to erect the crdche in 1981. The Committee challenged the denial
on free exercise grounds and the Second Circuit ruled that denial was not
necessary to serve a compelling state interest - compliance with the establishment clause under Lemon - because permitting the display did not
have the primary effect of advancing religion." The McCreary court concluded that the absence of secular Christmas symbols was immaterial to
the application of Lynch to the establishment clause question.7 4 The court
68. Id.at 1566.
69. Id at 1569 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
70. 739 F.2d 716, 730 (2d. Cir. 1984), affd by an equally divided court sub nom. Board
of Trustees of the Village of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985) (per curiam). The
Supreme Court's affirmance by an equally divided court does not itself demonstrate the correctness of McCreary relative to the other three cases; for such affirmances, according to
the Supreme Court, have no precedential value. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,216 (1942).
71. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 726-27.
72. Id.at 720.
73. Id. at 726-30.
74. I at 729. "The Supreme Court did not decide the Pawtucket case based upon the
"The Second Cirphysical context within which the display of the creche was situated ....
cuit also rejected the argument that the siting of the Pawtucket crbche on private land constituted a material distinction. IL
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also found that a properly presented disclaimer would support the conclusion that the display did not convey a message of government endorsement of Christianity."
III.

CRITIQUE OF LYNCH

Lynch plainly was a difficult case for the Supreme Court, not because
the pertinent establishment clause principles are obscure but because they
lead to a result at odds with powerful competing considerations.16 The
lower courts had an equally difficult time with Lynch. Their problem, like
the Supreme Court's, was not one of opaque legal standards, but rather
the unpalatable result produced by application of those standards. This
section will examine the problematic resolution by the Supreme Court of
the conflict it confronted, as an aid to understanding what may have motivated the lower courts to avoid its mandate. The subsequent section will
analyze and critique the lower courts' resolution of the dilemma Lynch
created for them.
Lynch has been severely, but justifiably, criticized." As described
above, the Court offered two basic justifications for its result in Lynch:
(1) the weight of history supports government recognition of religious
themes; and (2) governmental association with religious symbolism is rendered harmless because it advances a secular purpose and occurs in a context that also has secular elements. Neither proposition is satisfying.
A. Lynch and Historicism
Lynch's reliance on history has much in common with that in Marsh
v. Chambers.8 Both suffer from use of history in what Professor Michael
McConnell has characterized as "original intent subverting the principle
of the rule of law."" 9 Under this jurisprudential technique, the Court recites
75. Id at 725-30. The Second Circuit regarded Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981),
as controlling on the question of access by religious groups to use of government property
generally open to the public. That issue was presented in McCreary by the secular-purpose
prong of Lemon. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 724-25. Lynch controlled the primary-impact and
excessive-entanglement prongs. Id at 726-27.
76. 465 U.S. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Professor Mark Tushnet, for example, has described an acceptable religion clause
theory as one that explains why Lynch is wrong. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in theJurisprudenceof the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 999 n.4 (1986).
See also, Van Alstyne, supranote 3. Cf Marshall, UnprecedentialAnalysisand OriginalIntent
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 927 (1986).
78. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
79. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 362 (1988). I
recognize that Professor McConnell may agree with the result in Lynch, but it appears that
he would not approve of the Court's historical analysis. In a previous article, he contended
that the proper inquiry under the establishment clause is whether the challenged governmental activity "has the purpose and effect of coercing or altering religious belief or action."
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishmen4 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933,
940 (1986) [hereinafter Coercion]. Under that test, he argues that "the courts are wasting
their time when they draw nice distinctions about various manifestations of religion in public life that entail no use of the taxing power and have no coercive effect," citing Lynch.
Id at 939 & n.40. See also American Jewish Congress, 827 F.2d at 132-37 (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) (coercion test "as the central concern of the religion clauses has a solid footing"). Part of the reasoning that drives Professor McConnell's theory is the need to account
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selected instances of history that bear something more (in the case of
Marsh) or less (in the case of Lynch) in common with the challenged
activity.80 In Marsh, the Court reasoned that if the First Congress
appointed legislative chaplains, then such activity must be an accurate
reflection of the Framers' original intent concerning the establishment
clause and therefore constitutional today. The problem with such a formulaic, uncritically historicist approach - even if one accepts the premise
that the Framers' individual contemporary subjective intent, somehow
averaged or otherwise rendered in collective form, has relevance to constitutional interpretation today - is that it fails to identify any enduring, coherent set of principles, connected to constitutional purposes, upon
which contemporary conduct might reasonably be ordered. 1
for the numerous instances of early governmental support of religious activity, such as the
appointment of congressional chaplains. Coercion, supra, at 939. There are several questions
about his conclusion that a coercion test provides all the answers. First, some of the early
examples such as legislative chaplains, and the later example of Lynch itself, do involve use
of the taxing power. Public funds were disbursed to support both endeavors, and even Professor McConnell probably would agree that it is no answer to say that only relatively small
amounts were spent. It is the principle, not the principal, that matters. Madison, A Memorial
andRemonstrance Against Religious Assessments (c. June 20, 1785), reprintedin Two WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901) (expenditure of three pence of tax money
is cause for concern). Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance is appended to Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 63-72. But see Simson, supra
note 21, at 924 (suggesting adoption of a standard of materiality for questions of expenditures of public funds for religious purposes). Second, and more fundamentally, a test that
looks only at "coercion" fails to bridge adequately the gap between the historical evidence
and the circumstances of modern society. See Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid to Religion:
A False Claim about OriginalIntent 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986). See also, Tushnet,
supra note 77, at 998 (describing definitional inadequacies of "coercion").
80. The Court's use of history in Lynch seems even less principled. In contrast to Marsh,
the Lynch majority's historical review does not focus on the particular practice in question.
Such a focus at least arguably suggests that a majority of Framers sitting in the First Congress were not overcome by concern that legislative chaplains constituted an impermissible
establishment of religion. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 723-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, 359-69 (1987) (describing deficiency in "speaker's
meaning" view of historical intent, weakness of recourse to arguments about representative democracy in constitutional interpretation, and the inapplicability of arguments based
on stability and certainty to questions of individual liberty). Professor McConnell objects
that "[uinless we can articulate some principlethat explains why legislative chaplains might
not violate the establishment clause, and demonstrate that that principle continues to be
applicable today, we cannot uphold a practice that so clearly violates fundamental principles we recognize under the clause." McConnell, supra note 77, at 362. See also Kurland,
The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839, 842
(1986) (criticizing" 'law office history,' written the way brief writers write briefs, by picking and choosing statements and events favorable to the client's cause"). For a concise description of the origins of the historical school of jurisprudence under the leadership of the German
jurist Friedrick Karl von Savigny and its expression in nineteenth and twentieth century
American legal thinking, see Berman, Toward an IntegrativeJurisprudence:Politics, Morality,
and History, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 779, 788-94 (1988). This school, Berman explains, originally
reflected an integration of positivism, naturalism, and historicism. As a society matures,
law becomes more complex; but
law must never become merely a body of ideal proportions or a mere system
of rules promulgated by the state; it must always remain a particular expression of the social and historical consciousness of a people at a given time and
place. The professional or technical element must never become divorced from
the symbolic element or from the community ideas and ideals which underlie
both the early and the later stages of legal development.
Id at 789-90.
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Although not clearly articulated by the majority opinion, the constitutional significance of the history relied upon in Lynch appears to be
twofold. First, the Court suggested generally that governmental acknowledgment of religion is consistent with the "original intent" behind
the establishment clause. Second, the Court argued that because this
country has a long history of official recognition of religion, government
promotion of religious symbolism is acceptable as a general matter and
more particularly in the case of the creche. Both points are open to
criticism.
Professor Douglas Laycock recently presented an historical analysis
that examines the historical arguments underlying Lynch and Marsh that early practices of government support for religion indicate that the
Framers believed such practices were consistent with the establishment
clause. His analysis challenges the premises that because in the Framers'
time instances of government involvement with or recognition of religion
can be found, the establishment clause must be read today to preclude
only preferential aid.8 2 He points out that many of the early practices such as federal subsidies for missionary work among Indians and legislative chaplains - were preferential. It therefore seems doubtful that the
Framers understood the establishment clause to embody the principle that
nonpreferential aid was acceptable while preferential aid was not.8 3
Although nonpreferentialism was not itself relied upon by the Lynch
majority, Laycock's historical analysis provides a useful framework for
examining the conclusions drawn from history by the Lynch majority.
Laycock forcefully argues that it is the disparate reaction at the state
level to financial versus nonfinancial aid that helps us to distill a principle of establishment that is meaningful today. He lists numerous examBerman criticizes the "romantic nationalism" and "blind historicism" of contemporary legal
scholarship, and calls for "a recognition that law is an ongoing historical process, developing from the past into the future," with respect for past history as providing "sources for
adaptation of the law to new circumstances." Id at 795.
82. Professor Laycock demonstrates that the Framers "considered and rejected at least
four drafts of the establishment clause that explicitly stated the 'no preference' view." Laycock, supra note 80, at 879. Proponents of nonpreferential aid to religion rely on a considerable body of historical scholarship. See, e.g., R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION

(1982); M.

MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE

INTENTION OF THE AUTHoRs OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

(1978); Smith, Getting offon the Wrong

Foot and Back On Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion
Clauses of the FirstAmendment and a Critiqueof the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (1984).

He refers to the history of the debates in the states to shed light on what the Framers
generally understood the concept of "establishment" to mean. The Virginia debates centered on a general tax assessment that was, at least for its time, relatively nonpreferential.

It was against this proposal that Madison wrote his famous Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments. See supra note 80. For an account of that history by the
Supreme Court, see Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-14. The vote in Virginia against the assessment,
like the vote against an even more clearly nonpreferential proposal in Maryland, evidences
that the Framers' contemporaries concluded that "nonpreferential [financial] aid was a form
of establishment and inconsistent with religious liberty." Laycock, supra note 80, at 899.

Laycock further argues "tJhe debates in other states provide little evidence of a different
understanding." Id. at 899.
83. Laycock, supra note 80, at 915.
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ples of both coercive and preferential nonfinancial state aid to religion,
relatively uncontroversial at the time but surely intolerable today." Nonfinancial aid, however, merely supported what was an overwhelmingly Protestant community in early America. At the time, Laycock observes,
nonfinancial support for Protestantism was not generally thought to be
inconsistent with religious liberty "because almost no one could imagine
a more broadly pluralist state .... In short, the appeal to the Framers'
practice of nonfinancial aid to religion is an appeal to unreflective bigotry."5 Financial aid, the controversial establishment issue of the day, was
the focus of the Framers' attention, and when they thought about that
they rejected even nonpreferential aid.
Today, our society is culturally and religiously pluralistic to an extent
not imaginable in the Framers' time.8 6 In such a context, some generalization of the Framers' rejection of nonpreferential financial aid also to
preclude nonpreferential nonfinancial aid is necessary unless we are prepared to read the establishment clause to permit the preferential, coercive, and chauvinistic practices of early Protestant America. For Laycock,
that generalization means a theory that requires government to refrain
from encouraging or discouraging religious beliefs and practices. On occasion, the Court has spoken as though it similarly interpreted the establishment clause to require a firmly neutral stance toward religion.87
What of the later examples cited by the Court in Lynch, such as the
mottos "In God We Trust" and "One Nation Under God" and proclama84. Those practices included religious qualifications to hold office, denial of civil rights
to Catholics, criminal penalties (including the death sentence) for blasphemy, and enforced
observance of the Sabbath. The tax issue sparked controversy for a variety of reasons, including the splits it provoked among Protestant denominations. Id at 916-17.
85. Id at 918-19.
86. Id at 919-20. See also School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 214
(official U.S. census data lists 83 religious bodies of 50,000 or more members) and idat 240-41
(Brennan, J., concurring) (collecting sources describing religious homogeneity of late eighteenth century America).
87. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between Church and State.' Reynolds v. United States [98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)].
See also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 217-23 (reviewing Court's adherence to "wholesome 'neutrality' ");
Valente, 456 U.S. at 246 ("when we are presented with a state law granting a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply
strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.")
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tion of days of prayer? 8 Many are relatively nonpreferential, unlike the
practice in Lynch. They therefore do not provide support to the Court's
result in Lynch even under a distinction based on nonpreferentialism.8 9
In any event, it is difficult to see their relevance. They tell us no more
about understanding the original intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights
in relation to the propriety of the practice challenged in Lynch in the 1980's
than the institutionalized system of apartheid that prevailed in this country for a century following Reconstruction tells us about the intent of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the acceptability under the
equal protection clause of state-coerced racial discrimination in today's
society. 90
The Court appears to reason that because it would be unthinkable to
find the listed practices precluded by the establishment clause, we also
must view crdches as similarly acceptable. In a sense, the Court retroactively has created its own phantom precedent to support its result.8 ' Not
only does such an approach strain commonly accepted notions of judicial
restraint, it is tautological and self-serving. The Court does not tell us
why the practices it cites are consistent with the establishment clause.
It could be argued, especially if one adopts Professor Laycock's test, that
the examples cited by the Court merely evidence the attitude expressed
almost a century ago by Justice Brewer that "this is a Christian nation."'2
That may have been so as a practical matter in the Framers' day, but
it cannot stand as consistent, in any meaningful sense in today's society,
with the principle of religious liberty the Framers surely intended to
effect.
88. The religious motto on our currency was decreed in 1865; the Pledge of Allegiance
was modified to include the religious reference in 1954; and in 1952 Congress called on the
President to proclaim annually a National Day of Prayer. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at
449-50 & n.58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
89. In other contexts, the Court has held that preferential activity warrants strict scrutiny into the extent to which the challenged activity advances a "compelling government
interest" by a means "closely fitted" to the accomplishment of that end. Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. at 246, 255.
90. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 379-89 (discussing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896) and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
91. The Court on other occasions has, in dicta, listed a number of these practices, as
well as others arguably less reflectivw. of government endorsement of religion, as examples
of the "hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly" relation between church and state not required
by a common-sense interpretation of the establishment clause. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312-13.
It was also in Zorach that the Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, said, "We are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Id at 313. Justice Douglas,
however, believed that "once government finances a religious exercise it inserts a divisive
influence into our communities" that the establishment clause was intended to prevent. Vitale,
370 U.S. at 442-43 (Douglas, J., concurring).
92. Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). The Court's historical approach in Lynch appears even less satisfactory when one considers that it runs counter to the Court's general rejection of strict historicism in constitutional law. R. DWORKIN,
supra note 81, at 366. For example, the Court has noted "use of prayers and Bible readings
at the opening of the school day," even in the very few government-sponsored schools of
1789; and the practice flourished as public schools proliferated in the nineteenth century.
See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 267-68. Yet the Court held that practice unconstitutional in Schempp
and Engel.
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B. Lynch and Lemon
While the Court's adventure in historical analysis is unprincipled,
selective, and inconclusive, its application of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test
to the Pawtucket creche is disturbing for its very definiteness and lack
of ambiguity. If the Court meant what it said in Lynch, the Lemon test
allows wide latitude indeed within which to approve government participation in sectarian activities, at least when those activities involve recognition of and participation in religious themes that implicate traditions
as deeply a part of American culture as is Christmas.
At the very outset, the Court opens up the game by demanding that
the creche must be evaluated in the context of the "Christmas season."
At once, however, it is obvious that the Court has moved significantly
beyond the examples of contextual analysis it cites - Stone v. Graham93
and School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp. 94 In both examples, the challenged activity took place in a context that left little doubt about its religious orientation. The same activity, however, could have a different
character in another context. Thus, Bible reading in public schools for a
history course would be educational and therefore acceptable (that's what
schools are for), while Bible reading for its own sake in public school would
be religious and therefore not acceptable Ithat's what churches are for).95
The cr6che, however, has its greatestreligious significance in the setting
of Christmas - the very context the Court astonishingly suggests lessens that religious nature.", Indeed, in almost any other setting but
Christmas the crdche would be more akin to the Stone and Schempp examples.
Second, as Professor Van Alstyne points out in his critique of Lynch,
the Court substantially broadens the purpose prong of Lemon. 7 Under
Lynch, any secular purpose will do99 - rendering the test toothless for
all but the most explicit of religious motives. The "secular" purpose at
stake in Lynch, as described by Professor Van Alstyne, was municipal
government's decision to promote "the events, values, mysteries, customs,
and monotheism of a particular religion - the religion, hardly coincidentally, that is most widely subscribed to nationally as well as locally." 9
The Court did not even attempt to buttress its purpose analysis by recog93. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
94. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
95. Id. at 225. See supra note 22 (discussing Stone and Schempp).

96. See Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1177 (Christmas display setting "supportive" of crkche's
religious meaning); Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 89 & n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(Leventhal, J., concurring). But see id at 70-72 (Tamm and Robb, J.J., concurring) (inclusion of privately owned creche in government-sponsored Pageant of Peace does not violate
"primary effect" prong).
97. Van Alstyne, supra note 77, at 783.
98. In a footnote, the Court expressly states that Lemon does not require an "exclusively secular" purpose. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.6. Of course, there is quite an expansive
excluded middle between requiring an exclusively secular purpose and accepting any old purpose at all.
99. Van Alstyne, supra note 77, at 784. Accord, Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1164-65.
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nizing some ultimately secular purpose like that attributed to the Sunday Closing Laws in McGowan v. Maryland.'
Once we have climbed the foregoing pitches with the Court, the next
one - although to me the most difficult and disturbing when viewed in
isolation - seems relatively secure when considered in relation to what
preceded it. After all, the "primary effect" of Pawtucket's action was to
do no more than to accomplish its "secular purpose" as described above."'
Furthermore, although it is difficult to find support for the Court's result
in cases such as Walz v.Tax Comm 'n 2 and Zorach v. Clauson,113 which
plainly involved nonpreferential benefits, the Court can find something
of a belay in a case such as McGowan v.Maryland,14 in which the Court
sustained Sunday Closing Laws on the grounds of their wholly secular
effect of promoting a uniform day of rest, notwithstanding their undeniable effect (and in fact original purpose' 5 ) of encouraging observance of
the predominant denomination's Sabbath. But all three of those cases
arguably could be characterized as an accommodation of religion, by
government's decision to remove or not to impose practical burdens on
religious activity. Such practices are of course not strictly neutral toward
religion. Lynch, however, takes matters to a new level by characterizing
the benefit to religion occasioned by direct government sponsorship of
an undeniably Christian symbol as indirect, remote, and incidental - no
more an establishment than giving federal employees a Christmas holi10
day or exhibiting paintings depicting religious themes in a museum.
That is difficult to swallow. It seems to be one thing to give government workers the day off so that they can celebrate the birth of Jesus,
and quite another to join in or - worse yet - to sponsor the services.
And the creche quite obviously was not displayed in a museum or some
other neutral setting that might present it in a nonreligious fashion for
pedagogic or other nonreligious purposes; it was part of an observance
of a religious holiday.
So the Court must be saying that the creche is not
07
too much more.
The majority does not controvert the assertion that "some observers
may perceive that the city has aligned itself with the Christian faith by
including a Christian symbol in its display and that this serves to advance
religion."' 08 Instead, the majority concludes that the advancement of
100. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 710-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (McGowan, unlike Lynch, serves wholly secular goals).
101. Van Alstyne, supra note 77, at 784.
102. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
103. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
104. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
105. 1& at 431; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 263-64 (Brennan, J., concurring).
106. 465 U.S. at 683.
107. Id
108. Id
Professor Gary Simson has proposed a revision to the Lemon test that focuses on the
"three main evils" the establishment clause was intended to protect against: sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. Simson, supra
note 21, at 905. He would modify the primary-effects prong along the lines suggested by
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religion occasioned by the cr6che is within acceptable limits. The only reference in the opinion to where that line lies is the historical review and the
citation to cases such as McGowan. If the challenged activity is not much
more of an endorsement of religion than what has gone before, it is not
an establishment.109
The question thus becomes why the cr6che falls within the undefined
safety zone of permissible governmental involvement with religion. Justice
O'Connor's opinion sheds more light on the question than does the
majority's by concluding, as the majority implies, that the answer is
because a reasonable person simply would not perceive the cr6che to be
a government endorsement of religion, considering the ubiquity of government acknowledgment of religion. 10 Although, as suggested above, this
last step does not seem to be a big one considering how much ground the
Lynch opinion already had covered, for me it is the most troublesome and
seems the most wrongheaded. It is difficult to respond effectively to an
assertion like Justice O'Connor's, which purports to speak for some
hypothetical representative of a perceiving public. I am amazed that
Justice O'Connor and the four Justices in the majority can conclude that
a government-sponsored symbol of one of the most important mysteries
of the dominant religion, presented in the seasonal context with which
its religious aspect is universally associated, would not be perceived as
an endorsement of religion."u
How one perceives and reacts to religious and political issues, both
of which intersect in Lynch, is determined by a process not predominantly
rational.' Moreover, the person whose perceptions are of concern is one
whose views are not necessarily those of majoritarian (i.e., Christian)
America. Neither consideration is reflected in the majority's or Justice
O'Connor's opinions.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch (i.e., by focusing on the message communicated
to nonadherents); but Simson would modify the test by also asking whether the challenged
activity expended public funds to benefit materially the operations of a religious institution
or materially interfered with the authority of the religious group to decide religious doctrine.
Id. at 924. Simson would characterize the legislation upheld in McGowan as having a permissible "insubstantial adverse effect." Id at 929-30. Marsh, and by implication Lynch, impermissibly would communicate a material preference on the part of the state that citizens join
in the sponsored religious activity. Id at 928-29.
109. Professor Van Alstyne has characterized this as the Court's "any more than" test.
Van Alstyne, supra note 77, at 783. See also Citizens Concerned for the Separation of Church
& State v. City & County of Denver, 481 F. Supp. 522, 527 (D. Colo. 1979), vacated on other
grounds, 628 F.2d 1289 (10th Cir. 1980) ("no governmental act can be approved on the ground
that it is only a little bit unconstitutional").
110. Lynch, 465 U.S, at 691-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. Apparently, at least one commentator agrees with the Court. Fairchild, Lynch v.
Donnelly: The CaseFor the Crkche, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 459 (1985) (Court's approach in Lynch
is "common sense"). Compare Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 431, where the Court stated, "[wihen
the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain," quoted by Justice O'Connor in Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1157 n.13, 1159-60,1166.
112. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352

(1985); Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Convictions:Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011 (1986).
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Justice O'Connor describes the "purpose" prong as "subjective" and
the "effect" prong as "objective." While she is correct that the intended
message surely is a subjective matter, she is wrong to suggest that the
message conveyed is a purely objective matter. This is apparent from her
own statement that "[wihat is crucial is that a government practice not
have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement
or disapproval of religion" and therefore convey a message to nonadherents that they are political outsiders."' The question how nonadherents
would feel is subjective as to them. And it is one not easily answered even
hypothetically by a person as snugly inside the political fold as a lifetenured Supreme Court Justice.
Of course, the law abounds with so-called objective, reasonable-person
tests that require the decisionmaker to imagine how most people would
view a situation. Inevitably, that process injects a substantial dose of personal normative judgment; but perhaps that is acceptable when general
majoritarian political and social standards are in issue and the decider
is an assembly of members of the community that creates those standards
or at least is a person with enough sensitivity to such standards to garner
sufficient political support to become a federal judge. It is quite a different matter, however, when the concern is the sensibility of those whose
faith and culture may render their reactions alien and inscrutable to the
majority. In such a circumstance, great caution is in order. The Court,
itself hardly a representative sampling of religious, cultural, or political
pluralism, perhaps cannot be expected to know whether religious minorities would perceive Pawtucket's Christmas display as an endorsement of
Christianity. And there is no indication in the majority or concurring opinions, apart from the objections of the plaintiffs, that anyone bothered to
ask any non-Christian." ' Given the importance of the question and the
uncertainty of the decisionmaking process the Court has prescribed for
itself, it seems far more faithful to a genuine concern for the interests
Justice O'Connor aptly describes to assume that non-Christians might
have such a perception, than it is to conclude blithely that they do not
based only on an historical record which itself evidences Christian domination of the political process.
To summarize, there is much to criticize in Lynch v. Donnelly. The
Court's application of history is more advocacy than analysis. Without
113. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692. In her concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice
O'Connor refined the test, in the context of a challenge to legislation, to be "whether an
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools." 472 U.S. at
76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. There was, however, a substantial expression of concern from both the Christian
and non-Christian community. See Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1157 n.13, 1159-60, 1166. See also
L. Pfeffer, supra note 2, at 118-26 (describing objections of Jewish and Christian groups to
the practice of government-sponsored crdches). We must assume, however, that such evidence was not material to the Supreme Court's decision. See Goodhart, Determining the
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 166 n.20 (1930) ("in determining the principle
of the case, we are bound by the judge's statement of the material facts on which he has
based his judgment"); id at 170.
In Allen v. Morton, plaintiffs conducted a poll of viewers of the creche to show that
it had a substantial religious impact on its viewers. 495 F.2d at 88 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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any articulated justification, the Court extends considerably the outer
boundaries of McGowan, a case with which it may have little of principle
in common. And the Court answers the crucial question almost peremptorily and certainly without basis for insight into the concerns that should
matter most.
At bottom, Lynch appears to rest on a fundamental political choice
made by the Court. A reading of the establishment clause as generalized
and as demanding as that suggested by Professor Laycock would place
the Court in a difficult position. As every establishment clause opinion
of the Supreme Court recognizes, religion is and always has been an
undeniably pervasive aspect of American culture. For the overwhelming
majority of Americans, that religion is Christianity. And at least some
of those Christians are very active politically. For example, the Reagan
administration made school prayer a priority item on its agenda,"' and
the Republican party carried that crusade into the 1988 presidential election " ' In extreme cases of government expression of evangelical Christian sentiment like school prayer, the Court more or less has resisted such
pressures.'
Lynch, however, imposes greater pressure on the Court. I believe that
pressure results not so much from the fact that Christmas is so secular,
but more because it is so American. It is a commonplace to lament the
"commercialization" of Christmas, and Christmas is a cultural phenomenon that undoubtedly includes unambiguously secular elements. But
Christmas today in a sense is the quintessential expression of Christian
American life. The orgy of retail sales, the Santa Clauses, reindeer, snowmen, the family gatherings, and themes of goodwill and charity do not
necessarily make Christmas less Christian; but they do make it more
American. Thus, when the Supreme Court speaks of a "stilted overreaction contrary to our history and our holdings" and of "our religious
heritage," it seems to be saying Christmas is simply too close to home,
too American, for government participation in the celebration to be illegal.11 8 Perhaps more than legislative prayer, the religious symbolism of
1 9
Christmas "has become part of the fabric of our society."' The Court
surely would recoil from a result that would cast it in the role of the
"Grinch who stole Christmas."
Of course, one might object that such a position carries its own rebuttal under the establishment clause, as I have tried to suggest above; but
there is no mistaking which side wins in the Supreme Court when abstract
ideals of religious neutrality collide with the familiar and powerful tradi115. L. Pfeffer, supra note 2, at 114.
116. Kaus, On His Own: Bush's "New Ideas," Aug. 22, 1988 Newsweek at 22, col. 1.
117. Wallace, 472 U.S. 38.
118. As the Court observed in Lynch, "[n]o significant segment of our society and no
institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other
parts, much less from government." 465 U.S. at 673.
119. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
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tion of Christmas. One may as well be advocating "godless communism."' 20 The lengths to which the Court was willing to go in reaching
its result in Lynch merely emphasize that its commitment was to something it perceived as much more fundamental and important than coherent and principled establishment clause doctrine.
How then could the lower courts read Lynch as they did? That is the
topic taken up below. I will examine the bases upon which the courts distinguished Lynch and consider, in the context of the principles commonly
aggregated under the rubric "stare decisis," the extent to which inferior
federal courts are obligated to follow the trail blazed by the Supreme Court
when they believe that trail leads astray from the course charted by the
Constitution.
IV.

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF LOWER COURTS' TREATMENT OF LYNCH

The dilemma confronting the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits was
this: The defendant municipal government in each case had engaged in
activity that appeared to violate the establishment clause by sponsoring
in some fashion a nativity display. Writing on a clean slate, those three
courts would have had little trouble deciding for the plaintiffs. But the
Supreme Court precedent considering the constitutionality of such conduct, Lynch, seems to say that it is permissible. For the reasons set forth
above, Lynch appears to be wrongly decided. As a general matter, almost
universally thought to be beyond serious controversy, even "wrongly
decided" Supreme Court precedent binds lower courts.12' The lower courts
therefore have been placed in the position of reconciling the demands of
intercourt stare decisis with their own sworn obligations to uphold and
defend the Constitution and their own views of justice and liberty. How
the courts resolve that conflict will say much about their respective views
of their role as federal judges and their philosophy of law.
This inquiry divides into two broad areas. First, it seeks to describe
the conception of law (in this instance precedent) manifested in the three
opinions. That description requires an examination of how the lower courts
dealt with Lynch in the light of the principles that make up stare decisis.
The second step, after reaching an interpretation of those courts' version
of stare decisis, is a critique of that picture.
Stripped to its bones, this inquiry yields the following: First, each of
the three courts reached a decision that is semantically but not substantively defensible under Lynch. Consequently, I infer that each of the three
lower courts concluded that, at least in cases raising important constitutional questions in an area of constitutional jurisprudence that is charac120. For an example of the Jewish response to President Reagan's characterization of
the Soviet Union as "the focus of evil in the modern world" which "we are enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose... with all our might," see Freeman, Reagan's Speech
to Broadcast Evangelists Replete With References to God and Jesus, Feb. 1, 1984 Daily
News Bulletin of the Jewish Telegraph Agency, reprinted in L. PFEFFER, supra note 2, at
115-16.
121. See infra text and accompanying notes 128, 149-61.
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terized by its general incoherence, Supreme Court precedent may be read
with as narrow an eye as semantics will permit and that a lower court
is not bound by the salient interpretive political decisions made by the
Supreme Court. Second, I argue that such a position is poor judicial policy,
is inconsistent with important principles that I believe each of the courts
in question would embrace, and is especially troublesome for the subterranean way the courts adopted it.
With these themes in mind, and with more particular points concerning stare decisis to follow in their proper place, it is time to turn to the
specifics of the example at hand. The first question is how the Third, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits read Lynch.
A. Descriptive Discussion of Lower Court Opinions
1. The Two-Plastic-Reindeer and City-Hall Rules
As explained above, the Seventh, Sixth, and Third Circuits have confined Lynch to creches (1) not located at sites closely associated with
government and (2) not part of a larger Christmas display containing more
or less secular symbols of Christmas. The Court's opinion in Lynch offers
very little support for the notion that either the siting of the creche or
the presence of plastic reindeer
were what neutralized the religious sig22
nificance of the cr~che1
The Court never said in Lynch that the siting of the Pawtucket creche
on privately owned property vitiated its association with city government.
The crdche itself was city property, built and maintained by the city; and
122. The only commentaries on Lynch to find any substance in these distinctions are
the dissents of Judge Campbell in the First Circuit Lynch opinion and of Justice Brennan.
Justice Brennan's observation likely may have been more influenced by his desire to limit
what he believed to be the damage done by the decision than by careful analysis of the establishment clause or of stare decisis.
In a series of cases predating Lynch, the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado has reached conflicting results on this issue. Ultimately, the court considered
the presence of secular symbols in the overall display as serving "to minimize the creche's
importance as a religious symbol .... " Citizens Concerned for the Separation of Church
& State v. City & County of Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310, 1313-14 (D. Colo. 1981). The court
concluded that the Christmas display, erected on public property in front of Denver's City
and County Building, had a secular purpose, id at 1311; did not have the primary or direct
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, id. at 1315; and did not give rise to an excessive
entanglement with religion, id See also Citizens Concerned for the Separation of Church
& State v. City & County of Denver, 508 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1981) (same conclusions
on hearing for preliminary injunction).
The same display had been challenged in 1979. On a more poorly developed record for
the defense, Judge Matsch ruled that "the City's placement of the Nativity Scene on the
front steps of the City and County Building (the very building to which the Citizens must
turn for government) is widely viewed as an affirmation and support of the tenets of the
Christian faith." Citizens Concerned for the Separationof Church & State, 481 F. Supp. at

529. The court thus concluded that the crdche had the primary effect of advancing religion.
Id Judge Matsch believed that the "secular and religious aspects of the display cannot be
separated, and indeed, the latter may be intentionally presented so as to promote the former." Id at 530. Judge Matsch also found an excessive entanglement of government with
religion. Id at 530-31. Following remand from the Tenth Circuit's vacatur for lack of jurisdiction because plaintiff organization lacked standing, however, the district court in 1981
reached the conclusion described above.
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the opinion appears to assume that everyone who viewed the display would
know the city had sponsored it. By contrast, the displays in each of the
lower-court cases were privately owned and carried signs expressly
announcing that fact. Further, one quite easily could contend that the Pawtucket creche more powerfully conveyed a message of government endorsement of Christianity. In Chicago, Birmingham, and Pittsburgh, government's role was largely passive: it merely had made space available to
Christian groups that undertook to erect displays. Pawtucket, on the other
hand, had actively gone out into the community with its arguably evangelical message. And, as Judge Easterbrook trenchantly noted in his dissent in American Jewish Congress, it is far from obvious that whatever
appears in City Hall ipso facto reflects municipal endorsement. 22 The
Supreme Court has observed in the establishment clause context that
allowing religious and secular groups "equal access" to government
property "does not confer any imprimatur of state approval" on the reli-4
gious groups so long as a broad spectrum of groups is allowed access.'
To be sure, there is no reason to assume that the governments of Birmingham and Allegheny County, at least, did not endorse a pro-Christian position. ' But it is by no means clear that they did so more patently or
vigorously than did Pawtucket.
The argument that the presence or absence of plastic reindeer or Santa
Clauses in the display is of constitutional significance is no more persuasive. The Court plainly never said so in Lynch. Indeed, after describing
the display, the only other time the majority referred to the secular symbols was to state "[elven the traditional, purely secular displays extant
123. Do they all believe in Santa Claus, too? In 1979 the City invited John Sefick
to display some of his art in the lobby of the Daley center. One of the pieces
Sefick put on display was a life-sized tableau of former Mayor Michael Bilandie and his wife accompanied by a tape recording satirizing Bilandic's response
to the previous winter's record snowfall. The City tried to get rid of the art,
or at least turn off the tape and was met by an injunction. Sefick V.City of
Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. II. 1979). Once the City had opened the lobby
to art, the court concluded, it could not dispose of one piece because it disliked
the message.
827 F.2d at 132 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
124. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981). The Second Circuit applied this principle in McCreary,739 F.2d at 727. Justice Brennan, however, distinguished Widmar in his
Lynch dissent on the basis that Pawtucket had "singled out Christianity for special treatment." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 702 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The relevance of Justice Brennan's
observation is difficult to understand, in view of the fact that Lynch did not involve access
to government realty. The public forum doctrine under the free speech clause of the First
Amendment refutes the notion that government endorses, or is understood to endorse, the
content of every message communicated from its property. For a discussion of the public
forum doctrine, see D. BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY, 79-88 (1984).
125. There is some indication, however, that some members of Chicago government were
opposed to the creche. American Jewish Congress, 827 F.2d at 122-23 (describing controversy
and prior litigation involving the Chicago crdche). And the Christians of Scarsdale had to
enlist the court's assistance in gaining access to municipal property for their display. Of
course, the relevance of these facts to the perceptions of nonadherents itself raises factual
questions. It seems reasonble to assume that such matters would find their way into local
news coverage. In any event, whether religious groups can command access under the free
exercise clause to government property, as the plaintiffs did in McCreary,is doubtful after
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1391 (1988).
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at Christmas, with or without a creche, would inevitably recall the religious nature of the Holiday."' 26 The distinction proposed by the lower
courts seems to be at odds with their position with respect to the disclaimer signs. It is difficult to take seriously the proposition that plastic
reindeer and giant candy canes speak more loudly than plain words.
Finally, and by far most significantly, whatever inferences might be
whispered by the Court's mention of the location or elements of the Pawtucket display are overwhelmingly contradicted by the very loud voice
of the Court's legal analysis. As I have attempted to demonstrate above,
Lynch may have been wrong, but it was not obscure. At bottom, the lower
courts' distinctions concern whether government notoriously recognized
the religious origins of Christmas. That is exactly what the Court in Lynch
said government legitimately could do. To read Lynch otherwise is to
render unintelligible the Court's entire discussion of history, precedent,
and their bearing on the application of the Lemon test. Interpreting Lynch
to govern each of the lower court cases does not require stretching any
principle the Supreme Court's opinion considered important. 2 ' Instead,
to so read Lynch merely would acknowledge the decision about government sponsorship of religious symbols the Supreme Court expressly had
made.
2. Stare Decisis
What does this reveal about the conception of stare decisis held by
the lower courts in interpreting Lynch? The rule that Supreme Court precedent binds lower federal courts has a two-hundred year pedigree that puts
it almost beyond controversy,"' although the evident (albeit veiled) defiance of Lynch by the lower courts invites a closer look at the rule. This
point will be taken up below.'29 The further question arises: what is it that
binds the lower courts? The process by which lower courts determine
exactly what it is they are supposed to follow is so much a part of what
judges and lawyers do every day that discussing it is like discussing
breathing: We all do it to stay in business, but if we examine it too closely
we start to feel slightly anxious and tight in the chest. It is common to
126. 465 U.S. at 685. True, the Court did describe the so-called secular objects before
describing the crdche; but it hardly reflects a principled reading of precedent to ascribe legal
significance to the order in which the Court described the facts.
127. Application of Lynch to the facts before the lower courts did not require the kind
of extension raised, for example, by the question whether Brown v. Boardof Educationshould
apply to public transportation, which involved the impact of segregation on adults and not
just children and would have required the express overruling of precedent. See Kelman, The
Force of Precedent in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 3, 78 (1967) (lower court cases
decided immediately after Brown properly exhibited restraint and deference to Supreme Court
prerogative to overrule Plessy).
128. Kelman, supra note 127, at 4 ("there is an absolute duty to apply the law as last
pronounced by superior judicial authority"); R. DwORKIN, supra note 81, at 25 ("most American lawyers think that the lower federal courts are absolutely bound to follow past decisions
of the Supreme Court, but that view is challenged by some"). The exception Dworkin cites
is Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1982), rev 'd in part and
affd in part sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (1 lth Cir. 1983), affd, 472 U.S. 38
(1985). Id at 418 n.21.
129. See infra, text accompanying notes 139-64.
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speak in terms that do not explain much, such as the shibboleth that lower
courts are bound by the "holding" of Supreme Court precedent but not
"dictum," and that "material" differences in facts render precedent nonbinding. As any lawyer or judge knows, precedent can be manipulated
because the previous case "does not constrain the selection of which factors matter. "1 0Felix Cohen pointed out half a century ago that the attachment of legal significance to differences between the case at bar and the
relevant precedent, and there are always differences between any two
cases, involves ethical questions.131 And Karl Llewellyn has described the
Janus-like nature of the doctrine of precedent: the "orthodox view," under
which subsequent courts can confine precedent "to its facts" for purposes
of distinguishing troublesome precedent, and the "loose view," which
prior opinion for
ascribes precedential significance to any words in the
3 2
purposes of enlisting the aid of welcome precedent.1
My thinking about these problems has been clarified considerably by
the ideas Professor Ronald Dworkin expresses in Law's Empire. Dworkin describes law as a process of constructive interpretation, in which the
judge interprets the precedent, statute, constitution, or what-have-you,
to make of it the best that it can be, as part of a coherent body of principles that reflects the political morality of the community. 3 3 He organizes
the descriptive visions of law prevailing in the literature of legal philosophy
into three categories - law as convention (under which law is only those
political decisions expressly made by institutions authorized to make such
decisions, such as a legislature); law as pragmatism (under which law has
no historical force whatsoever, judges are free to decide each case based
on their own personal political views, and any suggestion to the contrary
in judicial decisions is just a noble lie strategically told for the sake of
appearances'3l); and law as integrity (which fits the constructive interpretation process mentioned above).
Comparing each vision of law against his standards of 41) fit with our
contemporary Anglo-American legal practice and (2) suitability to serve
as a justification for the application of the state's coercive power against
130. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
422, 425 (1988).
131. Cohen, The EthicalBasis ofLegal Criticism,41 YALE L. J. 201, 217 (1931). Professor Arthur Goodhart has suggested a set of "rules" for determining the ratio decidendi of
cases in the English system, but he glides over the key problem of the lower court's determination of which facts are material by relying on judges' good faith. Goodhart, supra note
114, at 181.
132. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 65-76 (1960).
133. R. DWORKIN, supra note 82, passim. For a thoughtful evaluation of LAw's EMPIRE
as a descriptive study of adjudication in hard cases, which focuses on the question of prospective overruling, see Note, Surveying the Realm: Description and Adjudication in LAW'S
EMPIRE, 73 IOWA L. REV. 131 (1987). For an exploration of the relationship between the ideas
expressed in LAW's EMPIRE and the positivists' claims, see Kress, The Interpretive Turn,
97 Ethics 834 (1987).
134. See, e.g., Singer, The Playerand the Cards:Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
L.J. 1, 58 (1984) ("[jludges rationalize their decisions as the results of reasoned elaboration
of principles inherent in the legal system. Instead of choosing among available descriptions,
theories, vocabularies, and courses of action, the official who feels 'bound' reasons from nonexistent 'grounds' and hides from herself the fact that she is exercising power").
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an individual, Dworkin argues that law as integrity provides the best
model. Within that model, to be sure, seriously controversial questions
of how to reconcile sometimes competing legal principles as well as the
broader political ideals of justice, fairness, and procedural due process
(which Dworkin views as including the principles of stare decisis) will arise.
Law as integrity requires the judge to engage his or her own political and
moral convictions in the constructive interpretation process; and law as
integrity recognizes controversies over particular principles, but views
society as a community united in part by its commitment to the integrity
of the concept of principle.
In my view, lower federal court interpretation of Supreme Court precedent that is as clear in its import as is Lynch can be viewed as approaching either end of a continuum of deference. 35 At one end of that continuum,
the lower court would attempt to identify the interests and principles at
stake in the precedential case, the doctrinal and historical context of the
precedent, and the underlying choices made by the precedent-setting court.
The facts that implicate those choices would be material, and the lower
court - if it viewed itself as bound by precedent that is on point - would
attempt to reach a decision consistent with the principles reflected in those
choices interpreted in the light of current times. This approach views precedent as substantive. At the other extreme, the lower court would evaluate the merits of the choices made by the precedential courts and
aggressively look for factual consonance or dissonance with the case at
hand, depending on the lower court's view of the merits. Both approaches
require a penetrating examination of the precedent, but the second looks
for the least deferential reading possible that is consistent with generally
accepted semantic norms of legal discourse: Regardless of what princi135. Professor James Hardisty has described the "bindingness" of precedent as lying
on a continuum. The most binding kind of precedent is "rule stare decisis," in which the
court clearly articulates a rule to be followed in subsequent cases, which promotes predictability and uniformity in later cases. Hardisty, supra note 7, at 53-56, 61-62. "Result stare
decisis" follows from the ratio decidendi of the decision, and provides greater leeway in subsequent decisions by allowing distinctions based on facts. Id at 56-59. He further suggests
that stare decisis may be understood as having varying referents, which he depicts graphically on a continuum of restrictiveness. Id at 62.
Professor Hardisty explains that "[tihe vagueness of stare decisis is functional; it allows
judges flexibility to adapt the law to new conditions." Id at 64. The appearance that judges
are restricted by precedent more than they really are creates an illusion of greater predictability, certainty, and fairness than actually exists. Id- at 65-67. This illusion results from
the adversarial nature of opinion writing as well as lawyering: "[Tihe multiplicity of referents of decisis serves the persuasive purposes of judges and practicing lawyers and would
seem to be endemic to an adversary system based on justification in terms of similarity to
and differences from prior decisions." Id at 67.
I do not understand Hardisty to be describing (or criticizing, for that matter) the "noble
lie" Dworkin ascribes to the pragmatists. Instead, Hardisty is exposing one aspect of judicial behavior that is familiar to most lawyers: Judges do not always say precisely what they
mean; and, like most legal writers, they employ rhetoric to achieve a variety of aims within
the law. It is a much further step, however, to describe law, as do some pragmatists, as wholly
nondeterminative and judicial opinions as mere artifice. It also is quite a different matter
to accuse judges, as I do in this article, of covertly defying what ought to be a determinative
rule and concealing that subversion behind the facade of factual distinction. For a skeptical
view of stare decisis and legal distinctions, see Schiag, CannibalMoves: An Essay on the
Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929 (1988).
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ples the lower court understood the Supreme Court to have had in mind,
the lower court would feel free to go its own way so long as it could do
so without saying two plus two equals five. This approach views precedent as semantic.
The two polar positions on this continuum do not necessarily relate
to breadth versus narrowness of precedent. The issue is faithfulness to the
choices made by the precedential court. It may well be that the precedent
itself is quite narrow. 13 Lynch is a good example. Although the Court
adopted an application of Lemon forgiving almost to the point of transparency, Lynch itself was confined to the relatively narrow field of government observance of the symbolism of religious holidays - more specifically
that of Christmas. Later cases have demonstrated that Lynch did not herald the demise of Lemon or signal the start of a wholesale disintegration of
whatever guiding principles might exist under the establishment clause."'
The two foregoing categories - precedent as substantive and precedent as semantic - bear some correspondence to Dworkin's categories
of law as integrity and law as pragmatism. Under law as integrity, the
lower court would read precedent to be the best it can be as a matter of
substance. If, so interpreted, precedent demands a result that is inconsistent with the lower court's best interpretation of the community's
applicable principles of fairness or justice, the lower court probably would
conclude that the procedural due process considerations of stare decisis
generally yield the best moral and political justification for the use of coercive force that implicitly underlies all legal rules and regretfully would
follow the precedent. (I say "probably" because there might be circumstances in which the principles of stare decisis themselves indicate a contrary result or justice and morality cry out for sacrifice of stare decisis
- important questions to which I shall return shortly.) Under law as pragmatism, the judge would view the precedent solely as a challenge to his
or her skill at overcoming semantic obstacles to the result guided by his
or her vision of what the good life requires.3 8
136. It might be that the precedent is such a bold step that its outer boundaries await
definition in later cases. See supra note 127 (comparing Brown and Lynch).
137. See supra note 21 (later application of Lemon).
138. R. DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 160. A possible third approach to precedent would
be that a lower court is bound only by the literal terms of the past political decision made
by an authorized entity, here the Supreme Court (assuming Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803) is law), and that any decision reached by the lower court beyond those
confines is based not on "law" but on some other source. This of course is law as conventionalism. I pretermit it in text because it is of little help in this exercise.
Dworkin persuasively argues that law as conventionalism, taken seriously, has very
little relation to what courts usually do because it describes law as vigorous only in easy
cases, which rarely find their way to court. In borderline cases, Dworkin explains, law as
conventionalism usually leaves a judge to his or her own extralegal decisions. The question
here is not where lie the outer boundaries of Lynch. As I have attempted to show, the facts
of each lower court case fall comfortably within Lynch's borders. The problem is how a court
reconciles the competing commands of different sources convention would regard as authoritative. The assertion that convention requires adherence to Supreme Court precedent over the
lower courts' reading of the Constitution assumes the outcome of an interpretive question
which itself is not answered by conventionalism.
Professor Harold Berman has urged an "integrative jurisprudence," which brings
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a. Anticipatory overruling
Is there a trump card in the lower court's hand? In certain circumstances, lower federal courts have expressly declined to follow a Supreme
Court decision admittedly on point on the grounds that the lower court
believes the Supreme Court no longer would follow the precedent." 9 Factors relied upon by lower courts to apply the so-called doctrine of anticipatory overruling include a perceived erosion of precedent by later Supreme
Court decisions in other areas of law, a perceived emergence of new doctrinal trends, and an indication by the Supreme Court that it will overrule
the precedent when presented with the appropriate opportunity. 10 Because
each of those reasons is tied to a perception of the Supreme Court's contemporary position premised on the Court's own expressions, they have
been considered appropriate bases for lower court departure from otherwise controlling precedent. 1' Bases considered improper for anticipatory
overruling, because they lack an articulable tie to views expressed by the
Court, include the desire to prompt reconsideration of precedent, a belief
that the Supreme Court erred in the previous case, and the perception of
difficulties in practical application of the precedent. 4 ' In deciding whether
to depart from Supreme Court precedent, lower courts have been admonished to balance conflicting duties: the duty to apply the latest, most "correct" legal rule; the duty to obey the Supreme Court; the duty to be honest
and straightforward in decisionmaking; and the duties to do justice14 in the
case at hand and to respect the need for certainty and reliance.
together the political, moral, and historical aspects of the giving of a legal order to social
relations. The alternative he advocates "must combine historical insights into law with the
political insights of legal positivism and the moral insights of natural-law theory." Berman,
supra note 81, at 797. To Berman, "all that needs to be subtracted from each of the three
major schools of jurisprudence, in order to integrate them, is its assertion of its own
supremacy. All that needs to be added is a recognition of their mutual interdependence."
Id at 801.
139. See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1981)
(Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) no longer accurate statement
of the law concerning implied causes of action); Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 472-74
(5th Cir. 1971) (the deference to legislative judgment in First Amendment cases established
by United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), eroded by later freedom of expression cases applying stricter scrutiny and abandoning the "privilege theory" of public employment); Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 441 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1971), affd,
406 U.S. 320 (1971) (Supreme Court has unambiguously signalled intent to overrule Moore
v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), and Transcontinental & W. Air v. Koppal, 345 U.S.
653 (1953), (concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies when presented with proper
case; Andrews is proper case); United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 847-48 (7th Cir. 1969)
(en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952), on point on the electronic eavesdropping issue, but "completely eroded" by Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and other cases). See generally, Kniffin, Overruling
Supreme CourtPrecedents: AnticipatoryAction by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FoaRHAM L. REV. 53 (1982); Comment, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of
Supreme CourtPrecedent 60 WASH. L. REV, 87 (1984); Wyzanski, A TrialJudge'sFreedom
andResponsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1952); Comment, Stare Decisis and the Lower
Courts: Two Recent Cases, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 504 (1959); Note, The Attitude of Lower Courts
to Changing Precedent, 50 YALE L.J. 1440 (1941).
140. Kniffin, supra note 139, at 53.
141. Id at 61-69.
142. Id, at 71-72.
143. Id at 74-85.
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Although it appears that the lower courts have taken an exceedingly
narrow view of Lynch, none of their opinions suggests that the lower
courts have concluded that the Supreme Court would abandon Lynch.
These cases therefore do not rely on the doctrine of anticipatory overruling; instead, the lower court's opinions must be read as to assume that
Lynch, whatever one concludes its reach to be, remains the law today.
That assumption surely is valid. There was no basis to conclude that subsequent precedent has eroded Lynch, a new doctrinal trend has emerged,
or the Court is awaiting a good opportunity to overrule Lynch. 4"
b. Other possible bases for defiance of precedent
1. Generalities- Is there any other basis on which lower courts can
expressly defy Supreme Court precedent? The notion that Supreme Court
precedent may be ignored has its proponents. The Reagan administration, through then-Attorney General Edwin Meese, has argued that the
Supreme Court's constitutional precedent binds only the parties to the
case and "does not establish a supreme law of the land that is binding
on all persons and parts of government, henceforth and forevermore."' 45
William Brevard Hand, Chief Judge of the Southern District of Alabama,
undertook his own historical analysis to conclude that the Supreme Court
had erred in (1)applying the establishment clause to the states, and (2)
ruling that the Constitution forbade school prayer. 46 Invoking the rule
of law and the considerations often applied to intracourt stare decisis, Chief
Judge Hand therefore expressly declined to follow Supreme Court precedent he conceded was on point.' 7 Other courts on occasion have declined
to follow applicable precedent of higher courts. 4 '
144. The granting of certiorariin Allegheny County occurred after all four lower court
cases were decided.
145. Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983 (1987). In the face
of a torrent of criticism, Meese subsequently backpedaled, asserting that he had meant only
that the Executive was free to criticize, not to disobey, the Supreme Court. See Neuborne,
The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1987).
146. Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala.
1983), rev'd in part and affd in part sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (1 th Cir.
1983), affd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
147. Jaffree, 554 F. Supp. at 1112-30.
148. Professor Joseph Singer, in his article explaining how the Critical Legal Studies
movement advocates responsibility and community, not nihilism, has urged legal scholars
to "perform an edifying role by broadening the perceived scope of legitimate institutional
alternatives." Singer, supra note 135, at 58. Professor Singer cites the example of Judge
Paul Garrity of the Superior Court of Massachusetts, who refused to comply with the decision of the appellate court reversing his six-month deadline to remedy what he had found
were conditions constituting cruel and unusual punishment at the county jail. Unlike Chief
Judge Hand, however, Garrity reconciled the conflict between his personal view of the Constitution and the institutional demands of his role as an inferior court by quitting the case.
Id at 58 n.167.
Professors Mortimer Kadish and Sanford Kadish have explored the circumstances in
which the institutionalization of a liberty provides justification for departure from legal rules.
M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM
LEGAL RULES (1973). The Professors Kadish describe the concept of "legitimated interposition," which "denotes instances where deviational discretion - power to act according to
the agent's best judgment in ways that are unauthorized or even prohibited by rules of [the
agent's official] competence - has become embedded in legal arrangements." Id. at 66. In
describing the relationship between legitimated interposition and the role of judges, the Profes-
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The positions of Mr. Meese and Chief Judge Hand are difficult to
defend on the basis either of fit with current legal practice or political
legitimacy. The Supreme Court takes the supremacy of its decisions
almost for granted, although on occasion it has expressly stated that
inferior federal courts are bound to adhere to applicable Supreme Court
precedent.149 Obviously, the legal force of such statements assumes precisely that which is in question. Some support for the conclusion can be
found in the structure of Article III itself, which vests the whole of the
judicial power in one "supreme Court" and authorizes the creation of "such
inferiorcourts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."1 0 From the function of judicial review recognized in Marbury v.
Madison, which at least Chief Judge Hand implicitly applied in entertaining the merits of a challenge to the constitutionality of Alabama's schoolprayer law, and the structural relationship between the Supreme Court
and the inferior federal courts, can be derived support for the bindingness of Supreme Court precedent.
Mr. Meese's opinion reflects his disagreement with Cooperv. Aaron,5 '
which relied on Marbury and the supremacy clause "' to hold that Supreme
Court interpretation of the fourteenth amendment "is the supreme Law
of the Land."' 53 The Court in Cooper reasoned that the oath of legislative, executive, and judicial officers to support the Constitution therefore
adherence to Supreme Court interpretation of the Constituembraces
54
tion.
Professor Burt Neuborne has offered three persuasive sets of reasons
why Mr. Meese's position does not accurately describe our legal system.'
First, "the idea of a cacophonous constitution," without a single authoritative voice, would render the Constitution ineffective as a check on the
sors Kadish suggest that, although judges are constrained by rules of law, the requirements
of justice sometimes are disserved by those rules and therefore extend the judge "a liberty
to make this judgment and to depart from the rules to achieve results consistent with the
ends for which his role is set up." Id- at 90. This point appears to be directed to courts of
last resort, id at 86, and does not seem to include departure by lower federal courts from
applicable Supreme Court precedent. Such action would be beyond the lower courts' constitutive competence, and would not derive from "a domesticated and integrally functioning instrument for achieving the ends of the legal system;" it therefore would constitute
usurpation, not legitimated interposition. See id. at 67-68 (discussing nature of legitimated
interposition generally).
149. Justice Powell, sitting as circuit justice, so stated inJaffree,459 U.S. 1314, 1315-16
(1983). Accord Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1982) (per curiam). InHutto, the Supreme
Court concluded that the Fourth Circuit had ruled contrary to the rule concerning proportionality review under the eighth amendment announced in Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980). Id. at 375.
150. U.S. CONST., art III, § 1 (emphasis added). Section 2 of Article III, and Section 13
of the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) provide for the "appellate"
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
151. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
152. U.S. CONST., art. VI.

153. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
154. Id. at 18-19.
155. Although Professor Neuborne's argument focuses on the relationship between the
Executive and Judicial branches, as did Mr. Meese's, much of the underlying considerations
apply to the relationship of the inferior federal courts to the Supreme Courts.
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"primary behavior" of government.", Second, the content and enforceability of constitutional rights would become a function of a party's ability to continue seeking judicial rulings until an acceptable one appeared;
and majority tyranny would become more imminent. 5 7 Third, Professor
Neuborne pointed out the overwhelming historical evidence in favor of
the authoritative force of settled judicial precedent. 5
2. A possible exception - One might envision an almost irresistible
case for deliberate, lower-court defiance of undeniably applicable Supreme
Court precedent. My colleague Richard Barkley has suggested the following hypothethical: Suppose some clear rule of procedural default, grounded
in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution, is announced
by the Court in the context of habeas corpus petitions from state capital
sentences. Thereafter (assume that issues of retroactivity do not arise),
a habeas petition comes before a federal district judge who learns two
things at the hearing: (1) the procedural default certainly has occurred
and the Supreme Court precedent inescapably bars granting the writ; and
(2) the result is the exclusion of overwhelmingly exculpatory evidence,
which otherwise certainly would have resulted in an acquittal upon retrial.
The district judge is confronted with the awful dilemma of having to
choose between the compelling moral demand that he or she exercise power
to prevent the state from killing an apparently innocent person and the
institutional integrity of the judicial and constitutional process. Justice
and procedural due process (in the form of stare decisis) are in a head-on
collision. It would be difficult to defend the morality of passing the buck
to the court of appeals or the Supreme Court or risking the prisoner's execution by denying the petition, even in the age of public defenders and
the occasional pro bono counsel.
There may be some results the law demands that are simply too unjust
for community morality, expressed through the courts' interpretation of
law, to countenance.' 5 Such acute situations, like Barkley's life-or-death
scenario, are probably compelling and rare enough for the tradition of intercourt stare decisis to tolerate as exceptions. Legal principles need not be
relentlessly or cruelly consistent to retain their coherence. As Dworkin
observes, political ideals of justice, fairness, and procedural due process
can conflict as well as compete. Law as integrity sometimes will require
very difficult moral choices from among them, as Barkley's hypothetical
illustrates. The application of judgment certainly will be called for, but
that judgment will be informed by the community's principles of law and
ideals of political
morality - restraints no less real because internalized
by the judge. 60
156. Neuborne, supra note 146, at 994-95.
157. Id at 996.
158. Id at 1000.
159. See R. Dworkin, supra note 82, at 101-04 (wicked law is still "law," but such practices "yield to no interpretation that can have, in any acceptable political morality, any justifying power at all").
160. Id at 257. See also LLEWELLYN, supra note 133, at 156-60 (reality of restraints judges
perceive on their use of the leeways of legal doctrine).
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Such cases should be rare indeed, however, for they do threaten erosion of law's coherence. One immediate problem raised by Barkley's
hypothetical is the imagined reaction of the state authorities. A constitutional confrontation between state and federal government could be
precipitated if the state, with some justification, refused to accept the district court decision as law."" Recourse to the federal district court's contempt powers hardly would seem appropriate, in the light of that court's
own admitted defiance of the Supreme Court precedent. Of course, the
state can appeal the granting of a writ of habeas corpus; 6 and the most
likely outcome would be correction by the court of appeals. Nevertheless,
the potential implications for the integrity of the rule of law are severe;
and the slope is very slippery.
Even if one acknowledges the legitimacy of defiance of precedent in
individual cases of extreme injustice, such wrenchingly grave concerns
are not presented by Lynch. To be sure, individual religious freedom is
a matter of great importance; and religious conflict has long been, and
remains today, a source of almost unbelievable fear, violence, hatred, and
bloodshed. But the circumstances of the case must be kept in perspective: Neither municipally sponsored creches nor a rule prohibiting them,
as offensive as either might be to some, is going to kill anyone.
3. The case at hand - It is exceedingly doubtful that the Third, Sixth,
or Seventh Circuits would join either Chief Judge Hand or Mr. Meese in
their views on the bindingness of Supreme Court precedent. Such a position surely would be regarded as too radical to merit serious consideration by those courts. And very few judges, especially federal appellate
judges, would risk the anarchy16 3 and nihilism most believe would ensue
from that position. Nor does it appear that the courts in question regarded
municipal cr6ches as a moral outrage that no just society ought to tolerate, of the kind that might justify an exception to intercourt stare decisis.
This puts readers of the lower courts' opinions in the position of concluding one of two things: Either (1) the lower courts really believed that
the city-hall and two-plastic-reindeer rules sensibly interpret Lynch consistently with the principles applied by the Supreme Court; or (2) the lower
courts disagreed with those principles, saw no basis upon which to negate
161. For example, consider the political firestorm sparked by the Supreme Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), in which the Court found Georgia's
assertion of jurisdiction over the Cherokee reservation contrary to the Constitution, laws,
and treaties of the United States. Id at 561-62. Georgia refused to appear before the Supreme
Court and state officials repudiated the Court's decision. President Jackson, who took no
steps to enforce the decree, is alleged to have said of Worcester, "John Marshall has made

his law; now let him enforce it."

FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

83

(1982 ed., Strickland, et al., eds.). Whether Jackson actually made that remark has been questioned, and the Court did not actually issue an order directed to the Executive Branch. Id.
at 83 & nn. 173-74. The confrontation was resolved in 1833, when Georgia's Governor Lumpkin
pardoned the individuals convicted under Georgia's assertion of jurisdiction over the reservation. Id
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982).
163. "But unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided
the judges of those courts may think it to be." Hutto, 454 U.S. at 375.
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Lynch as law, and sought to reconcile the conflict they perceived between
Lynch and their independent understanding of the establishment clause's
strictures by fastening onto factual distinctions that obviously have little or no bearing on the decision reached by the Court in Lynch. Based
on the foregoing discussion of the merits of those distinctions, it is difficult
4
to avoid concluding that the second description is correct.
B. Critique of Lower Court Opinions
Can we find a justification for the view I have imputed to the Third,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits? One way to approach the problem is to ask
whether the issues raised by intracourt stare decisis have anything to
teach us about the degree of deference a lower federal court should accord
Supreme Court precedent.'
Discussion of intracourt stare decisis most commonly focuses on the
considerations involved in the overruling of the precedent of the court
of last resort. Stare decisis is seen as a kind of presumption that must
be overcome by strong countervailing interests. 66 Traditional interest
analysis focuses on the impact of overruling precedent on reliance, pre67
dictability, certainty, neutrality, judicial efficiency, and fairness.' The
issue usually is characterized as resolving the tensions between the need
for a better rule or standard of law, 68 the fairness of providing the party
to benefit the "most correct" judicial thinking on the subject, and the
appearance of justice, on the one hand, and upsetting the reasonable expectations of the party who justifiably relied on the old rule, a sense of stability and predictability for all those who must order their affairs according
to the courts' dictates, and the appearance that legal rules and standards
are determined by objective, neutral, and enduring principles not subject
66
to shifts in judicial personnel or temperament on the other hand.'
164. Dworkin, in refuting a dogmatically positivist theory of law, has criticized analyses
that portray judges as either "well-meaning liars" or "simpletons." R. DWORKIN, supra note
81, at 40-42. His criticism is not entirely at odds with the views I express in this article.
First, I do not read Professor Dworkin to contend that no judge ever could be fairly consigned
to either category. Second, the argument in this article does not attempt anything like a
comprehensive theory of law, or a sweeping characterization of how judges decide cases. My
focus in on a narrow example, which I believe does approach something like the distinction Professor Dworkin abjures. I would not put the matter in the same terms as he does, as that
would be overstating the point. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the issue of judicial truthfulness cannot be avoided here. To the contrary, to me it emerges as the key consideration.
165. As mentioned, Chief Judge Hand sought to apply such considerations in deciding
to ignore Supreme Court precedent. The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that such application was erroneous does not necessarily mean that the principles embodied in intracourt stare
decisis have no relevance whatsoever to intercourt stare decisis. It simply means that those
principles do not provide any basis for a lower court to exceed its competence.
166. Hardisty, supra note 8, at 49-50.
167. Id; see, e.g., Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional
Law, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 467, 472-84; H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 565-92
(tentative ed. 1958); Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1941).
168. This could be indicated by, for example, changed circumstances, evolving social
values, or more enlightened thinking about the legal problem at hand. See generallyW. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS 176 (1980).
169. See, e.g., Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978), overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1960).
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It often has been suggested that in constitutional cases, the interest
in correctness of result and the practical unavailability of correction by
legislation should lower the threshold. "' Some commentators have suggested a second look at this position. Professor Maltz has identified two
problems of uncertainty that can result from overruling constitutional doctrine. Retrospective uncertainty arises when actions are taken by persons
or institutions in reliance on the previous rule, which later are found
improper under the new rule. 7' Maltz also identifies the problem of
prospective uncertainty, resulting largely from observance of the requirement of Article III and its related forms of prudential self-restraint, in
which the contours of a doctrinal change remain undefined until numerous later cases have been decided. 7 Finally, Maltz distinguishes between
cases in which the Court overturned precedent because it later perceived
that the previous decision misapplied the premises under which it had been
decided, 7 3 and the more significant instances in which the premises of the
earlier decisions were reexamined and found wanting.'7 , Maltz cautions
that the practice of reexamining underlying premises in constitutional law,
especially when such instances occur frequently, enervates the restraining force of neutral principles on constitutional decisionmaking and raises
the suspicion "that each succeeding majority is simply using the Constitution as an excuse to enforce its own perceptions of good social policy."' 75
Dworkin's description of law as integrity avoids the overkill implicit in
the concept of "neutral" principles by recognizing the importance of the
judge's own judgment of social and political morality, constrained by the
obligation to interpret law as a coherent body of principles that both fits
legal practice and justifies the use of coercive force. '
Other commentators also have questioned the conventional wisdom
that constitutional decisions should be less difficult to overrule. For example, in addition to invoking the interest of predictability, Judge Easterbrook has argued that such an approach subverts the constitutional
amendment process both by circumventing the supermajority requirement
(and its goal of promoting stability in government institutions) and by
170. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695; Maltz, supra note 168, at 467. The most familiar articulation of this principle is by Justice Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 407-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
171. Maltz, supra note 168, at 472-73. The example cited by Maltz is the overruling of
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), in which the Court had held that due process did not
require states to provide free legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants, by Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962). The impact of the change was dramatic, as Gideon was
accorded full retroactive effect. Maltz, supra note 168, at 473 n.28, citing Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 250 (1969).
172. Maltz, supra note 168, at 473-78. Maltz cites as an example the Supreme Court's
fragmentary approach to defining the limitations on the imposition of the death penalty.
173. Id. at 478-82, comparing Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), with City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam).
174. Maltz, supra note 168, at 481-84, comparing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948),
with Reed v. Reed, 405 U.S. 71 )1971), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
175. Maltz, supra note 168, at 483-84, citing Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of
ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
176. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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sapping the motivation of those who otherwise might seek to change the
text. Judge Easterbrook instead would apply the same standards for
adherence to precedent, whether constitutional, statutory, or common law.
For example, stare decisis must yield when the accretion of precedent creates such internal inconsistencies as to provide no meaningful guidance
to judicial decisionmaking, when the order in which cases have come to
the court has backed the court into an unacceptable corner, or more generjudgments strongly announce that time
ally when moral and prudential
17 8
for change has arrived.
It could be argued that a lower federal court, while not exactly at liberty to ignore Supreme Court precedent, does properly enjoy the discretion
to cut it exceedingly fine. One could invoke arguments in support of an
aggressively nondeferential approach that would resemble those frequently deployed in defense of intracourt overruling of precedent. As
Judge Easterbrook has pointed out, "manipulation" of precedent can serve
the beneficial function of demonstrating the need for the Supreme Court to
revisit ill-considered decisions, by evidencing either the unworkability of
precedent or the need for refinement.7 9 And perhaps a more adversarial
lower court would prompt the Supreme Court to be more careful in the first
instance, at least to say clearly what it means. A less deferential reading
of precedent also would allow greater flexibility and would bring to bear
the considered judgment of a greater number of judges. In this sense, the
less deferential approach would dilute the power of the Supreme Court
and thus, by sheer diversification, could reduce the potential for tyranny
of "a bevy of Platonic Guardians."' 8 Lower courts also would be more
free to seek justice, and to apply the "correct" rule, in individual cases.
And one might argue that the availability of corrective review by the Supreme Court could serve as a check on excessive exercise of this approach.
General principles of intracourt stare decisis also supply countervailing arguments. Predictability would be less under a less deferential review.
Both prospective and retrospective uncertainty for the party benefitted
by the precedent would increase. A party could be less certain that its
past conduct, while seemingly sanctioned by the Supreme Court, would
be safe in courts of appeals; and the foundation for future planning would
be unstable. Conscientious district courts would be placed in the awkward
position of having to choose between defying two apparently contradictory views from their superiors. Uniformity also would suffer. This is an
especially important consideration in constitutional law. The Constitution itself contradicts the proposition that one's constitutional rights
properly may depend on whether one lives in Michigan or Rhode Island. 8'
Further, there is no guarantee that lower courts would always seek to maximize individual liberty, or to promote other choices one might regard as
desirable. We should be skeptical that Supreme Court review can or should
177. Easterbrook, supra note 131, at 430-31.
178. Id at 425-26, 432.
179. Id at 424-25.
180. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
181. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1 & 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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be expected to provide much protection. As a practical matter, the
Supreme Court's case load makes it very difficult for the Court to exercise much supervision over the lower courts once it has spoken on an
issue.182
There also is a downside to the ameliorative function served by less
deferential reading of precedent. Judge Easterbrook's observation concerning the effect of greater willingness to overrule constitutional decisions on the forces for change in the text also could be generalized to apply
to the problem of lower court deference to Supreme Court precedent. By
partially shielding the public, and the Supreme Court, from the consequences of the Court's precedent, lower courts can suppress criticism and
deflate the pressure for change. Part of what is so troublesome about
Lynch is the Court's flaccid commitment to individual religious liberty
- the majority opinion's silence on that subject is awesome - in the face
of the pressure of majoritarian culture, tradition, and preference. The voice
of minority outrage that might otherwise appropriately be raised in
response loses both its vigor and its persuasive force when the lower courts
quietly tell everyone that what the Supreme Court did really was a little
thing, no big deal. As any allergist knows, we often can build up a tolerance for what otherwise would be toxic by consuming it in small doses.
It should be apparent by now that there are no killer arguments on
either side of this debate, just as there are none on the underlying substantive issue. The very fact that the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
could write the opinions they did without having to rewrite the dictionary demonstrates both points. But all reasons are not created equal, and
few choices are wholly determined by rational processes.
Notwithstanding my objections to Lynch, I think those three courts
made a poor choice. The main reason I think so, heretical by some standards and not entirely the result of rational weighing of commensurable
considerations, lies in my belief that in law the means can sometimes be
more important than immediate ends because they in turn can implicate
less immediate but sometimes more compelling ends.
As I have attempted to show, the three courts faced three options,
each with its unappealing aspects: (1) follow Lynch, warts and all; (2) condemn Lynch explicitly and refuse to follow precedent admittedly on point;
or (3) find some way to wiggle out of following Lynch without explicitly
182. The Supreme Court received a total of 5,268 petitions for certiorari and direct appeals
in 1987-88. It was able to grant review in only 167 cases. Telephone interview with Clerk
of the Supreme Court (October 31, 1988). For discussion of the relative demise of the Supreme
Court's error-correcting role after the Judiciary Act of 1925, Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229,
43 Stat. 936, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1294 (1982), and of the effects of the Court's increasing caseload on its institutional function, see Helman, ErrorCorrection,Lawmaking, and
the Supreme Court's Exercise of DiscretionaryReview, 44 U. Pirr. L. REV. 795, 795-803,

848-73 (1983). It appears, however, that the Supreme Court has found the time to review
Allegheny County. Nevertheless, the Court's political role in today's society is one of broad
strokes. Big questions, not flyspecking distinctions, are the business of the Supreme Court;
and it hardly has time to repeat itself. The availability of en banc review at the court of
appeals level, however, does provide a more ready check at least on panel decisions.
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renouncing the principles of stare decisis. The problem with the first choice

is that it leads to a result the lower courts apparently believe is inconsistent with the establishment clause, thereby producing one immediate
end that is undesirable but by means that are admirable for their straightforwardness, fit with legal practice, and faithfulness to the principles of
stare decisis. The second choice achieves one desirable immediate end
(preventing government sponsorship of Christianity) by means also
praiseworthy for their candor, but yields the undesirable less immediate
result of compromising the system of judicial hierarchy contemplated by
Article III and very much a part of our legal heritage and current practice. The third choice achieves the desirable end of protecting the principle embodied in the establishment clause, but it does so by a means I find
most disturbing and leads to two undesirable less immediate ends: it
renders stare decisis practically meaningless while misrepresenting what
is going on.
With a downside to each choice, why should the lower courts pick (1)?
In addition to the reasons canvassed above in support of deference to
precedent, (2) is simply too much at odds with how most people believe
our judicial system works. For the reasons discussed above, hardly anyone, especially judges, would maintain that each inferior federal court
is entirely free to march to the music of its own drummer, even in hard
cases.
The principal problem with option (3), the one the three courts actually chose, is that it forced the courts in effect to dissemble thrice about
what they were doing. First, the courts gave the impression that they
understood Lynch to establish the two-plastic-reindeer and the city-hall
rules. I have tried to show that Lynch will not bear that interpretation.
Second, they created the false impression that they were operating within
the confines of stare decisis. But that cannot be the case in the face of
the previous point. Third, and to me most disturbing, they purported to
mean what they said. Each opinion reads as though the courts were treating law as substantive, yet a hard look in the light of Lynch reveals the
contrary.
Dworkin's description of law as integrity is a perceptive metaphor that
captures not just "wholeness" but "trustworthiness" as well. To provide
the moral justification for the application of coercive force, law must be
more than something that hangs together. It must be something we can
trust and believe in. Faith may be one of the most important forces in
our society. Faith in each other and in our institutions and ideals is the
glue of community, keeps the economy going, and allows us to live together
without paranoia. And the strength of our legal system does not derive
solely from its recourse to force to enforce its demands - the Constitution's origins are proof that the state does not enjoy a monopoly on violence. The strength of our legal system is our faith in its integrity.
It is difficult to maintain confidence in a legal system when judges
behave the way we expect skillful tax counsel to act in serving their clients'
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interests.'83 Loopholes and technicalities - law as semantics in action are fine things to the person whose purpose it is to evade the goals of
the law. The fact that the adversarial system demands such conduct by
lawyers, however, reveals that we expect more from judges. This doesn't84
mean that judges should pretend the law is a "brooding omnipresence."
Quite the contrary, it means that judges should not pretend at all. When
judges purport to base their decision on silly distinctions like the "twoplastic-reindeer rule,' 8 5 it appears that they are not telling the truth about
what they are doing. Lawyers are taught from the very first that "truth"
can be a conveniently elastic concept indeed; but when all is said and done,
we want to know who won and why. Although some may regard it as a
mark of intellectual sophistication to be able to say one thing while meaning another, and a sign of resourcefulness to think of such a distinction,
that does not mean it is a good thing for judges, whose work product is
the reasoned opinion that explains and justifies the result reached, to do. 188
To face the bad news is a mark of courage and integrity, qualities most
people would agree judges should display. The Supreme Court has looked
foolish and has lost credibility as it has foundered around, confecting spurious distinctions between its own precedents and trying to avoid the
difficulties that would ensue from an establishment clause theory that
meant business, like the one suggested by Professor Laycock.8 7 The bad
news there might be that the Court would be constrained to conclude
government has no business promoting religion, especially Christianity,
the way it sometimes does. Perhaps we would have to print new coins,
members of Congress would have to see their own chaplains in their own
183. For a discussion of the tension inherent in the choice between rules (over- and underinclusiveness, arbitrariness) and standards (brinksmanship), see M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

15-63 (1987).

184. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
185. Comment, supra note 22, at 495 & n.113.
186. For an overview of the goals underlying the time-honored requirement that courts
set forth the grounds for decision in a reasoned opinion - including avoidance of the appearance and reality of arbitrary decisionmaking, the explication of what the law is, the disciplining
effect of exposing in writing one's analysis, and the benefit of collective thinking on an appellate court - see W. REYNOLDS, supra note 169, at 57-67.
For a clever study, in the form of a novel, of the relationship between sincerity and maturity, see D. ROBERTSON, THE SUM AND TOTAL OF Now (1968).
187. Examples are Zorach, 343 U.S. 306 and McCollum, 333 U.S. 203. Zorach upheld
a New York public school program whereby students were excused from otherwise compulsory attendance for a period of time during the day so they could participate in religious
education or devotional exercises at religious centers. 343 U.S. at 308. McCollum struck down
an Illinois program of the same kind, the only difference being that the schools required
the students to remain within the school building for religious instruction or services, conducted in space made available for such purposes. 333 U.S. at 205. It is difficult to see how
the program in Zorach is less a use of the state's compulsory public school machinery to
provide pupils for religious education than the Illinois program. To be sure, the provision
of tax-supported school facilities by Illinois was an aggravating factor; but the manipulation of compelled classroom attendance "to channel the children into sectarian classes"
appeared to have been a sufficient basis to hold the Illinois program unconstitutional. Zorach,
343 U.S. at 316-17 (Black, J. dissenting); see also Zorach at 320-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (state coercion, the "pith" of the constitutional defect in release-time programs, equally
present in Zorach and McCollum; distinction between the two cases "is trivial, almost to
the point of cynicism").
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churches, and Christian groups would have to seek sponsorship elsewhere
for the symbols of their beliefs. It may be understandable that the lower
courts in dealing with Lynch have imitated the example of evasiveness
and dissimulation set by the Supreme Court, but it is no more commendable.
Law is complex and difficult. It can serve as a means to perpetuate
injustice, exploitation, and oppression or as a guardian of liberty and fairness. Law's complexities and difficulties are the tools of the lawyer's trade,
employed in the service of the client's interests. In the course of legal argument, lawyers play a game and speak a language they and the courts
understand. But judges are public servants, and I believe their work ultimately belongs to the people. I" When courts speak, therefore, at least they
should say what they mean. In the creche cases, this would mean the lower
courts either should have said that the rule in Lynch stinks, but whatever
value inheres in a stable, hierarchical system of judicial policymaking is
more important than the value of preserving the increment of individual
religious liberty lost to Lynch, or they should have said they believe Lynch
requires an unconscionable result and the values at stake are momentous
enough to warrant refusal to follow it. The outcry provoked by the Reagan administration's contention that Supreme Court decisions bind only
the litigants, or at least not the Executive Branch,8 9 was tremendous;"'
but at least those offended knew what they were up against. As suggested
above, outrage can be a politically healthy thing. It should not be suppressed by clever, nervous lawyers in black robes.
Finally, there is more at stake here than public perception. Patterns
of thinking, like patterns of overt behavior, can become habitual. As anyone engaged in an intellectually demanding profession is aware, the mind
like the body must be exercised to remain fit. The same might be said
of character. The practice of dissimulation and pretext, by those charged
with a public trust that demands the highest level of integrity, is a dangerous thing. For anyone with a conscience and integrity, judging must
be an enormously difficult task; and the temptation to hide in the shadows
of legal sophistry must at times be powerful. There is a serious risk that
the more often a judge takes the easy way out, the more ingrained becomes
his or her habit of doing so and the flabbier becomes his or her capacity
for intellectual honesty.
CONCLUSION

Lynch is bad law, but the stratagem employed by the lower courts
in evading it made worse law. I do not believe the establishment clause,
interpreted in the light of today's society, permits government to spon188. Cf Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 So. CAL. L. REv. 1357, 1365-66 (1988) (discussing increasing public consumption of judicial opinions).
189. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
190. One has to wonder whether the administration would have taken the same position if there weren't several Supreme Court decisions that frustrate portions of the administration's agenda.
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sor the symbolism of one of the chief mysteries of the Christian religion.
As disturbing as Lynch is, however, I find even more troubling its interpretation by the lower courts. That interpretation cynically portrays law as
nothing more than semantics, and betrays the integrity that gives law
its life. Because so much depends on judicial integrity, we should be wary
of courts that attempt to talk out of both sides of their mouths - in this
case by (implicitly) swearing allegiance to follow the decisions of the
Supreme Court while dispatching such decisions to oblivion with a wink
and lawyerly sleight-of-hand.
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